

The Colloquium

Media Industries in Global Frames: Craft, Collaboration, and Competition

May 2 (Wednesday)

02:00 p.m. – 05:00 p.m.	A Master Class with Professor Michael Curtin Media Industries for Beginners: Tutorial and Discussion
06:30 p.m. – 08:00 p.m.	Welcoming Dinner House of Lingnan (Chinese restaurant in campus)

May 3 (Thursday)

09:15 a.m. – 09:45 a.m.	Registration @ Paul S. Lam Conference Centre (AM308)
09:45 a.m. – 10:00 a.m.	Welcoming Remarks
	Session 1
	Chair: Chung Pei-chi (Cultural and Religious Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong)
10:00 a.m. – 10:25 a.m.	On the Contours of Media Industries Research Paul McDonald (Arts and Humanities, King's College London)
10:25 a.m. – 10:50 a.m.	Mobile Hollywood: Where Craft Becomes Service? Kevin Sanson (Communication, Queensland University of Technology)
10:50 a.m. – 11:15 a.m.	Business Models of the Commercial Creative Industries: a New Direction? Nobuko Kawashima (Economics, Doshisha University)
11:15 a.m. – 11:40 a.m.	Discussion
11:45 a.m. – 01:00 p.m.	Lunch at the House of Lingnan
	Session 2
	Chair: Darrell William Davis (Visual Studies, Lingnan University)
01:15 p.m. – 01:40 p.m.	Platform Patrol: China, the United States, and the Global Battle for Data Security Aynne Kokas (Media Studies, University of Virginia)
01:40 p.m. – 02:05 p.m.	The Film Factory: Boundaries in Media Industry Kristian Feigelson (Film Studies, University of the Sorbonne Nouvelle)
02:05 p.m. – 02:30 p.m.	Prison On Break? The Prison Cycle and the Korean Film Industry Jinhee Choi (Film Studies, King's College London)
02:30 p.m. – 02:55 p.m.	Discussion
02:55 p.m. – 03:25 p.m.	Tea Break

Session 3

Chair: Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh (Visual Studies, CCS, Lingnan University)

03:25 p.m. – 03:45 p.m.

Developing Scripts in the New Era

Syou-Ling Fu (Communication, National Chengchi University)

03:45 p.m. – 04:05 p.m.

Crowd sourcing, Niche audience: Independent Distributors in China

Shi Chuan (Shanghai Theatre Academy)

04:05 p.m. – 04:25 p.m.

Film Distribution in Hong Kong: Market, Censors and Audiences

Winnie Tsang (Managing Director, Golden Scene)

04:25 p.m. – 04:45 p.m.

Old Films Never Die, They Just Fade Away: The Digital Restoration and Promotion of Taiwan Film Classics

Lin Wenchi (English, National Central University)

04:45 p.m. – 05:05 p.m.

Discussion

06:00 p.m. – 08:00 p.m.

Dinner for Conference Speakers at Hoi Tin Garden Restaurant

May 4 (Friday)

Keynote Speech

10:00 a.m. – 11:20 a.m.

Post Americana: 21st Century Media Industries

Michael Curtin (Duncan and Suzanne Mellichamp Professor, Film and Media Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara)

12:00 p.m. – 02:00 p.m.

Closing Lunch: University Club

Keynote Speech | Friday morning

Michael Curtin (Duncan and Suzanne Mellichamp Professor, Film and Media Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara)

Post Americana: 21st Century Media Industries

Abstract

In 1941, publisher Henry Luce invoked the post-imperial promise of an “American Century,” urging his compatriots to assume the responsibilities of global leadership, a vision that ultimately coalesced as a Pax Americana. If Luce’s admonition seemed prescient to some, it was perhaps a bit tardy by the standards of Hollywood. For in fact American mass media had already extended their transnational influence in the wake of World War I and would take similar advantage after World War II and the Cold War, culminating in almost a century of cultural hegemony.

Yet today we are experiencing a proliferation of new media options that decenter, disperse, and erode cultural hierarchies and spatial boundaries, so that the very concept of global leadership seems curiously outré. Daily media diets around the world have grown more diverse and robust, with more than half the world’s population now living in cities that provide cable, online, and mobile services to billions of citizens. By comparison, in the year 2000, less than one percent of the world’s population could access high-speed broadband and no one owned a smartphone or social media account.

Yet at a broad structural level this diversity is facilitated by a convergence of screening options (e.g., multiplexes), television formats (reality), distribution platforms (streaming), marketing tools (social media), and stylistic conventions (intensified continuity). Moreover, institutions of cultural production, distribution, and labor have become globally interconnected in unprecedented ways.

The 21st century therefore marks a significant rupture that calls for fresh concepts and methodologies for studying the forces, fissures, and dynamics of contemporary media industries. This presentation delineates the distinctive features of contemporary media and examines the transnational contours of post-American media by comparing new centers and spheres of production, circulation, and use. Throughout it reflects on the implications for craft, competition, and collaboration by exploring such issues conglomeration and convergence as well as personalization and divergence.

Bio

Michael Curtin is the Duncan and Suzanne Mellichamp Professor of Film and Media Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is also director of the 21st Century Global Dynamics Initiative and associate researcher at the Center for Sociological and Political Research in Paris. Curtin’s research and teaching focus on media globalization and cultural geography from the perspective of industry, policy, and labor studies. He is co-editor of two recently published University of California Press volumes, *Voices of Labor: Creativity, Craft, and Conflict in Global Hollywood* and *Precarious Creativity: Global Media, Local Labor*. Curtin is executive editor of *global-e* and co-editor of British Film Institute’s *International Screen Industries* book series.

Post Americana: 21st Century Media Globalization

Preliminary draft (Not for citation)

Michael Curtin

In 1941, publisher Henry Luce invoked the post-imperial promise of an “American Century,” urging his compatriots to assume the responsibilities of global leadership, a vision that ultimately coalesced as a Pax Americana.¹ If Luce’s admonition seemed prescient to some, it was perhaps a bit tardy by the standards of Hollywood. For in fact American mass media had already extended their transnational influence in the wake of World War I and would take similar advantage after World War II and the Cold War, culminating in almost a century of cultural hegemony.

Yet today we are experiencing a proliferation of new media options that decenter, disperse, and erode cultural hierarchies and spatial boundaries, so that the very concept of global leadership seems curiously outré. Daily media diets around the world have grown more diverse and robust, with more than half the world’s population now living in cities that provide cable, online, and mobile services to billions of citizens. Cinema options have expanded dramatically as part of a middle-class leisure culture that is tethered together by the multiplex, theme park, and shopping mall, all of which revolve around branded artifacts that transcend national frontiers. Television broadcasting, a medium historically regulated by the state, has given way to an unruly multiplicity of channels while billions of people download or stream audiovisual content to view on a range of devices, including tablets and smartphones. Moreover, viewer behaviors are increasingly driven by what they discuss on social media, making the promotion and management of ideas a difficult challenge for commercial and government institutions. Viewers have also become producers (or prosumers), not only in the realm of entertainment, but also in news, so that media professionals find themselves chasing stories that bubble up as well as those that filter down.

Thus, at a phenomenological level, one senses decentering, dispersion, and an erosion of boundaries. Yet at a broad structural level, translocal and transnational media flows are in fact facilitated by a convergence of platforms (e.g., Alibaba), formats (reality television), and stylistic conventions (continuity editing). Institutions of cultural production, distribution, and labor have likewise become globally interconnected in unprecedented ways.

Yet at a broad structural level this diversity is facilitated by a convergence of screening options (e.g., multiplexes), television formats (reality), distribution platforms (streaming), marketing tools (social media), and stylistic conventions (intensified continuity). Moreover, institutions of cultural production, distribution, and labor have become globally interconnected in unprecedented ways.

Some of these developments were anticipated before the turn of the century, but only in their most embryonic forms. One need only reflect on the fact that twenty years ago satellite television—a transnational mode of *broadcasting*—was emblematic of the fin de siècle media revolution, while today the novel dynamics of digital media are characterized by *personalization* via handheld devices. Another way to express this distinction is to note that in the year 2000, less than one percent of the world’s population had access to a high-speed broadband connection, no one had a smartphone, and it would be four years before the launch of Facebook and nine years before the launch of Weibo.²³ Media globalization has engendered a complex play of integration and differentiation, of dominance and resistance, and of nationalist authoritarianism and post-

national solidarities. With respect to media industries, we see the global becoming local and the local becoming global. One could call this glocalization or hybridization, yet the larger framework for thinking about these mixtures is to invoke the dynamic and plastic processes of scale-making that are constantly at work in media industries.⁴ What's distinctive about the current moment is that these projects transcend national borders with relative ease and involve diverse ensemble of institutions and personnel.

The 21st century therefore marks a significant rupture that calls for fresh concepts and methodologies for studying the forces, fissures, and dynamics of contemporary media industries. This presentation delineates the distinctive features of contemporary media and examines the transnational contours of post-American media by comparing new centers and spheres of production, circulation, and use. Throughout it reflects on the implications for craft, competition, and collaboration by exploring such issues conglomeration and convergence as well as personalization and divergence. In doing so, it's important to depart for a moment from the technological determinism implied by the foregoing account to reflect more fully on the structural conditions underlying these changes.

The American Century

The vertiginous avalanche of technological change that we've experienced in the past twenty years often obscures the larger historical and structural frameworks through which media competition, collaboration, and craft are unfolding. Although ours is indeed an era of technological disruption, the larger context is marked by transition out of an extended period of American cultural hegemony, one that was both remarkable and distinctive.⁵

The long history of empire has featured recurring waves of military conquest and economic exploitation complemented by the spatial extension of cultural influence in art, architecture, language, entertainments, and cuisine.⁶ What sets the American Century apart is the fact that it was punctuated by three *world wars* that vanquished competitors and delivered a series of technological innovations that proved crucial to its neo-imperial project, especially in the realm of popular culture.

Before World War I, United States cinema was a relatively domestic industry that relinquished international distribution to Anglo counterparts who plied the shipping lanes and commercial exchanges of the British Empire. After the war Hollywood studios wasted little time establishing their own overseas offices while their European competitors were recovering from the ravages of military conflict.⁷ The war also provided a pretext for the US government to bring orderly innovation to radio research, banish British interests from the American airwaves, and organize what would become of the world's most powerful radio oligopoly.⁸ Intentionally or not, World War I was good for business.

By the late 1930s, however, US government relations with its media industries grew tepid, as regulators sought to rein in the powerful film and broadcasting oligopolies they had enabled.⁹ Public and private interests were realigned, however, during and after World War II, as American

movie companies were abetted by US free trade policies, language dubbing services, and other forms of assistance.¹⁰ Wartime innovations with radio technologies and propaganda techniques furthermore established the frame for postwar policies that envisioned television as a linchpin of American leadership of the so-called Free World.¹¹ Perhaps more intentionally than not, world war was again good for business.

During the 1960s and 70s, challenges to US hegemony mounted, culminating in an international campaign for a New World Information and Communication Order, which attracted broad-based support at the United Nations until it was scotched by the neo-liberal Reagan-Thatcher political project of economic restructuring and military escalation.¹² Again, government policies were good to American media businesses that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, seemed poised to bring Mickey and Batman to every neighborhood and village around the world.¹³

Post Americana

This very truncated account of the American century is useful for two reasons. First, it reminds us of the geopolitical calculations and military pursuits that—at a very deep structural level—shaped the contours of competition, collaboration, and craft in twentieth century media industries. And secondly, it directs our attention to the unanticipated decline of American cultural influence as being spawned not by the autonomous wonders

of Internet and digital technologies but rather by China's rise (WTO 2001), Islamic jihad (World Trade Center 2001), and the increasing vitality of media institutions and users that operate in the interstices of the dominant global system (Nollywood 2003; The Pirate Bay 2003).¹⁴ In other words, we have good reason to wonder if, despite the enduring magnitude of US-based media conglomerates, the American Century is passing and in what ways the rules of the game are changing.

Moreover, it's worth noting that, like its precursor, Post Americana is very much a product of calculated and orderly endeavor. The People's Republic of China has, for example, self-consciously employed its policy apparatus to exploit the scale of its domestic market en route to transforming its media industries and extending its cultural reach.¹⁵ Arab regimes and media moguls have avidly competed for cultural influence across the Middle East and North Africa, while at the same time ISIS and its counterparts honed the propaganda potential of online and social media with astonishing sophistication.¹⁶ Informal, but no less orderly, media institutions are posing challenges as well, including transnational media pirates and youth culture communities that have exploited the opportunities of a lavish satellite and oceanic communication infrastructure that was overbuilt during the nineties and collapsed in the dotcom meltdown at the turn of the century.¹⁷ As telecommunication prices spiraled downward, it opened the door to innovation and transnational cooperation among groups that had been on the margins of media production and distribution.

Of course the future is uncertain and American media corporations have successfully rebuffed previous challenges. During the 1910s, recall that Hollywood had many competitors abroad and during the 1930s, the German and Japanese film and broadcasting industries were impressively growing their capacities at home and abroad.¹⁸ Similarly, during the Cold War elaborate and sophisticated circuits of exchange existed among media institutions and actors in Second World and non-aligned nations.¹⁹ In other words, American media hegemony was never a stable and fully accomplished reality, but was rather a participant and beneficiary of a larger geopolitical project. The question now is how will these industries fare in an era of diminishing US power and what does it have to tell us about the current context of media competition, collaboration, and craft?

Speculation and Financialization

Before we explore those questions more closely, let's add another layer of analysis by circling back to the Reagan era to reflect on some of the economic policies that at the time seemed especially promising, such as the financial deregulation, which in turn spurred the development of new financial instruments and fostered the interconnection of securities markets around the world via sophisticated data networks.²⁰ The far-reaching impact of this policy shift has earned copious attention from critics of neo-liberalism, but these

policies have had especially profound effects on media industries with respect to speculation and financialization.

For example, it's notable that Ted Turner (son of an Atlanta billboard entrepreneur) and Rupert Murdoch (son of an Adelaide newspaper publisher) rose to global prominence during the 1980s on a tide of "junk bonds," a novel form of corporate financing that at the time was considered exceptionally risky and carried therefore very high interest rates. In order to attract lenders, Turner and Murdoch concocted lavish fantasies of a global village woven together by satellite television channels and eager transnational advertisers. Since the bonds came due at regular intervals, the only way to stay solvent was for them to deliver ongoing and prodigious expansion of their enterprises. Each financing round was therefore tied to new acquisitions and each acquisition was complemented by flamboyant rhetoric about the potential of media globalization and corporate conglomeration. Turner was able to launch the first truly global television news service and Murdoch was the first outsider to muscle his way into the inner circle of the American media oligopoly. Both benefited from deregulation and novel forms of financing but they also benefited from the unknowable potential of global media markets.²¹

Their rhetoric and financial strategies became infectious. In 1990, a group of Chinese investors led by Li Ka-shing, then Hong Kong's wealthiest billionaire, launched Asia's first privately owned telecommunications satellite, its footprint stretching from the Pacific to the Mediterranean and from Siberia to Sarawak. Although originally aimed at corporate clients, Li's son, Richard, seized the opportunity to use the satellite as a platform for building Star TV, a transnational television service aimed at the world's most populous and diverse continent. Like his counterparts from Atlanta and Australia, Richard Li fashioned himself as a McLuhanesque visionary, stoking the embers of media revolution by making bold pronouncements about the twilight of mass broadcasting and the dawn of pan-Asian television. According to Li, Star promised to erase spatial

barriers and national frontiers, bringing together far-flung audiences that were yearning to participate in a continental turn toward global modernity.²²

Anna Tsing's scholarship on the resource extraction economy of Indonesia argues that inflated claims and colorful rhetoric generally play a role in conjuring the potential for "spectacular accumulation," noting that spectacle has been a fundamental component of gold rushes, stock bubbles, and land grabs. It has also been a recurring characteristic of media revolutions, especially at moments when the prospects for new technologies are so uncertain.²³ Along with popular taste, patent claims, and political interests, spectacular discourse is a central factor in shaping the development and *value* of a "new" medium.²⁴

Richard Li assiduously fueled the fantasy of pan-Asian media in order to orchestrate the aspirations of transnational advertisers, corporations, and media enterprises. Star promised to reach almost three billion people, a truly unfathomable audience, but even if it rallied only a fraction of the whole, its potential was stunning enough to garner the attention of corporate advertisers and media competitors, as well as Rupert Murdoch who, after an extended courtship, took control of Star in 1993 for \$870 million, which at the time was a stunning price for a very speculative venture.²⁵

Indeed, the gold rush was on, as the 1990s became a decade of feverish dealmaking that included the launch of pan-Arab satellite television services, the accelerating transnationalization of South Asian media, and the acquisition of two major Hollywood studios by Japanese electronics manufacturers. Anxious about their future, major American media companies pressed for the passage of a new telecommunications law that stripped away what few regulatory restraints that remained, arguing (disingenuously at the time) that it was necessary for American firms to bulk up and go global or be swallowed up by foreign interests.²⁶ The fever finally broke with Time Warner's disastrous merger with American Online, but the legitimization of transnational media leviathans had been indelibly established.

These sprawling conglomerates, which were underwritten by complex financial arrangements, were furthermore facilitated by the rising prominence of shareholder value as the preeminent principle of corporate governance, a process that some researchers refer to as financialization. These scholars contend that since the 1980s, public policy has fostered a "Copernican revolution" that has elevated the influence of the financial sector in almost every aspect of commercial enterprise.²⁷ In some ways it could be argued that financialization attempts to rationalize corporate structures and behaviors that are essentially unfathomable. It does so by celebrating quantitative metrics and short-term profitability over foundational investments in research, development, and human capital. It seeks to enumerate the value of each constituent element of the corporate conglomerate through an endless parade of divisional profit and loss (P&L) reporting exercises that supposedly impose discipline and accountability in an environment built on rapacious speculation. Quantitative fetishization.

Consequently, today's corporate managers find themselves responding to the relentless and mercurial demands of financial analysts, hedge funds, and institutional investors. The resulting

tsunami of institutional metrics and data points obscure as much as they reveal, but they nevertheless serve as justification for decisions large and small. Media workers often experience these trends in their dealings with studio executives and producers who privilege market calculations over creative risk and novelty. Financialization also imposes relentless pressure to do more with less, wringing out cost economies that show little regard for the creative sacrifices or safety risks those directives entail. These escalating demands are often insensitive to the realities of the workplace and raise fundamental questions about the financial legerdemain that keeps the entire system afloat.²⁸

Thus, speculation, conglomeration, and financialization are key structural elements of a form of media globalization that unexpectedly seems to be undermining American hegemony. Whereas during the 1990s many imagined of satellite broadcasting raining Mickey and Batman down on eager viewers around the world, we have instead witnessed the emergence of an industrial landscape featuring complex competitive conditions at various scales in diverse contexts around the world. Moreover, the big Western media conglomerates now compete and collaborate with such counterparts as Rotana from Dubai, Reliance from Bombay, and CJ Entertainment from Seoul. In the digital, gaming, and social media spheres it's China's Tencent, France's Ubisoft, and Russia's Yandex.

21st Century Media Industries

With these transformations in mind, we can begin to delineate some of the features that distinguish media industries in the 21st century from their counterparts during the American Century.

First of all, as mention above, financial instruments and circuits of distribution have changed dramatically since the 1990s. Not only are Hollywood films conceived, financed, and circulated transnationally, so too are Arab television shows, Korean pop songs, and French video games.²⁹ Of course, many other cultural products still serve local and national audiences, but transnational media distribution has escalated dramatically, driven by competitive pressures and facilitated by new technologies.

Secondly, the social relations of media production have stretched across space, initiated primarily by the pursuit of cost economies among the worlds most prosperous and prolific producers, the Hollywood studios. With film, television, and video game production budgets ballooning into hundreds of millions of dollars, producers began to develop contingent ties to studio facilities and government entities around the world. Today, cities such as Vancouver, Prague, and Hyderabad compete to offer "world class" infrastructure, labor, and government subsidies that facilitate a geographically mobile and protean mode of production.³⁰

Thirdly, this transnational production network is made possible by a convergence of professional practices that have emerged via knowledge exchanges that take place in offices and production studios, as well as in the international markets for content exchange (e.g., MIPCOM). Workers at these sites share techniques as well as insider tips, gossip, and industry folklore. Film festivals (Busan) and awards ceremonies (African Movie Academy Awards) also provide contexts for deliberations about aesthetic and professional practices.³¹

Fourthly, as media professionals interact in these transnational venues, much of what they learn and observe filters back to national and local contexts where textual features and production techniques are imitated or adapted, resulting in hybrid content that is reimagined for different publics. Remarkably, adaptations move “up” and “down” as well as “across.” That is, content and aesthetics not only circulate widely, they are also refigured in order to address different topographies of imagination. And they create new topographies. What was once a Latin American regional media market has recently become interwoven with the very substantial and prosperous Latin market in the United States, resulting in a new hemispheric scale of popular imagination, creation, and circulation. A foundational genre of this media sphere is the telenovela, which has changed dramatically as a result of globalizing forces, and has moreover become an agent of change by influencing producers in distant locales, such as Istanbul, Lagos, and Beijing.³²

Finally, we are witnessing new patterns of interaction between media users and producers, as well as among users themselves. Once seen primarily as consumers, today viewers and fans amply express themselves in a variety of ways and media producers systematically monitor this discourse, creating feedback loops that shape story lines and characters. Moreover, online commentary and recommendations have become fundamental factors in the popularity of media texts and in the expansion of media options.³³

In China, for example, social media sites like Weixin, Weibo, and Tudou have stimulated an explosion of awareness about foreign titles as well as local niche offerings, which used to be unavailable in mainland mass media. Netizens also volunteer for subtitling teams that each year make thousands of foreign titles almost instantly available.³⁴ Moreover, user-generated content has mushroomed, again blurring the distinctions between media creators and consumers, and blurring distinctions between cultural points of origin.³⁵ Setting aside debates over piracy, one also finds that peer-to-peer sharing of media content has exponentially increased the transnational availability of media content.³⁶

Consequently, we now live in an era of transnational media that have been referred to as media scapes, spheres, regions, and zones.³⁷ These are protean spaces of imagination that are constituted and reconstituted from top to bottom, spaces that would have been unimaginable during the 1980s when a trans-Pacific telephone call cost \$3.20 per minute, when blockbuster cinema was the proprietary province of Hollywood, and when government regulations and technical standards prevented TV viewers in Singapore and Senegal from watching the same program.

Researchers have historically focused on media’s capacity, or putative mission, to reinforce local and national ties, but we’re now seeing the ways in which media worlds emerge, scale, and diminish in response to a relentless tug of actors and forces.³⁸

Comparing Capitals, Scales, Configurations, and Complications

New centers, spheres, and trajectories of interaction and circulation.

...to be continued.

Collaboration, Competition, and Craft

In what ways might this inform our thinking about competition, collaboration, and craft?

...to be continued.

Session 1 | Thursday morning

Chair: Chung Pei-chi (Cultural and Religious Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Paul McDonald (Arts and Humanities, King's College London)

On the Contours of Media Industries Research

Abstract

While the object or objects of media industries research might at first seem straightforwardly self-evident, there are various reasons for questioning and problematizing the contours of the field. The convention of labelling and demarcating media industries according to the monetization of specific forms of content – e.g. the recorded music industry, or the games industry – ignores how forms of media content frequently hold relationships to multiple industries (Stern 2016). The dependences of these industries on various forms of infrastructure (Parks and Starosielski 2015) or resource economies (Acland 2016) requires us to look beyond media towards interrogating the material depths of media industries. Rather than presume hard divisions can be drawn between legal and illegal spheres of media exchange, it is now recognized that formal and informal economies always exist across a spectrum (Lobato and Thomas 2015). Furthermore, the advancement of micro- (Caldwell 2008) and meso- (Havens, Lotz and Tinic 2009) scales of analysis invites us to question at what level does the industry of media take place? Taking a broad overview of these and other points of debate, this presentation aims to stimulate discussion around what we might consider to be the scope, depth and methodological grounding of media industries research.

Bio

Paul McDonald is currently Vice Dean (People and Planning) for Arts in the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, King's College London, and was previously Head of Department for Culture, Media and Creative Industries.

Previously he held the positions of Professor of Cinema and Media Industries at the University of Nottingham (2011-15), Professor of Cinema at the University of Portsmouth (2007-11), Reader in Film at Roehampton University (1999-2007), Senior Lecturer in Media at South Bank University (1996-1999), and Senior Lecturer in Media and Performance at the University of Salford (1990-96).

Before entering academia, Paul trained as a professional actor at the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art and worked in various areas of the media industries including animated film production, film exhibition, studio photography and publishing.

Paul hold a PhD in Film Studies from the University of Warwick, and a BA Honours, First Class, in Film and Drama (major) with Philosophy (minor) from the University of Reading.

Mobile Hollywood: Where Craft Becomes Service?

Abstract

This presentation is driven by three tentative but critical provocations drawn from ongoing interviews with location managers in production hubs outside of Southern California that host Hollywood film and television projects. First, scholarly preoccupations with the tensions between craft and creativity obscure the key input service workers make to film and television production. Secondly, a global or mobile mode of production has displaced the value of craft with an even greater emphasis on service. And, finally, making service work in film and television production “more visible” reframes debates about creative labor in fruitful ways.

Locations work is a productive case study because, historically, the duties they perform are an uneasy fit within the prevailing dichotomy between craft and creative labor. Certainly, there are elements of both in the work they do but the labor they undertake as part of a production is distinct in a number of ways from the workshop-like departments of the camera operator, set decorator, or wardrobe designer. Today, as production has become increasingly mobile, the nature of locations work has become fraught with tensions: representatives of foreign locations actively promote locations work as one of amongst many ‘services’ they provide to visiting producers; various industry bodies based in Southern California are advocating for the job’s status as craft; and the allegiances of an ever-expanding global community of workers are increasingly fractured, confused, and even acrimonious. Ultimately, then, the tensions around the nature of locations labor demands closer attention to the type of work film and television production demands in the global era, the discourses available to both academics and workers to define the nature and value of that work, and the stakes—both good and bad—of acknowledging the increasingly integral notion of “service” in the production of screen content.

Bio

Kevin Sanson is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Communication at Queensland University of Technology. He is a co-founder and current managing editor of *Media Industries*, the first peer-reviewed, open access, online journal devoted exclusively to critical media industries research. His own research focuses on issues related to digital disruption, working conditions, and globalization in the film and television industries.

Mobile Hollywood: Where Craft Meets Service?

Preliminary draft for internal circulation

Kevin Sanson

I. Creativity and Craft in Location Scouting

Location experts – either a scout or a manager – are one of the first individuals hired by a production, sometimes even before the director and production designer so they can start to collect images of potential locations based on their breakdown of the script’s locational needs. This process, naturally, entails travel of variable distances, especially for experts based in Los Angeles where filming today rarely takes place. The spread of incentives and rebates have exacerbated the process since location experts often find their choices are preemptively limited to an existing set of regions where the producer anticipates cost savings. Highly sought-after scouts can spend a significant amount of time in transit, and those with enough industry clout make sure they negotiate not only their pay rates but also other necessities like business class airfare. It’s simply too much travel in a compressed amount of time to work productively if you can’t sleep on the plane. At the height of their careers, leading location scouts report being away for the bulk of a calendar year with momentary returns home in between jobs. It’s in those brief moments, I’ve learned, that they try to tend to home gardens that have gone into disrepair and mend waning personal relationships with partners, children, and friends.

Yet, this part of the production process allows location experts to most fully realize their creative potential. They visualize the locational needs of a script, travel near and far to capture an array of images, and then curate those collections into what they hope is a meaningful and productive complement to the director’s and production designer’s intended vision for the project. Scouting is also one of the most precarious components of locations work. Scouts are alone, often in unfamiliar environs as they search for the perfect production site. As this is part of the pre-production process, no one really knows what they are doing or where they are doing it. The recent murders of location scouts in San Francisco and Mexico have become common reference points in conversations with location managers, as many of my interviewees recounted their own anxious stories: being in a bogged down vehicle in croc infested waters, for example, or trekking what turned out to be a 14-mile hike through the desert when they initially anticipated only being away for a few hours. No mobile service. No producer. No familiar face waiting back at the hotel.

Historically, location experts invested time in preparing for show-and-tell meetings with producers, directors, and production designers. Here was their opportunity to curate their location images to their creative counterparts and work collectively to identify what locations best serve the project’s vision. Indeed, many individuals take pride in the curatorial aspect of locations work. They are, after all, the experts here, and are intimately aware of a range of other creative and technical issues that can complicate the viability of one location over another no matter which one “looks” the best on film. How does the light change throughout the day, for instance, or how might the tide impact access to the perfect beach location? What natural obstacles, like unpaved roads, might hinder easy access for the trucks and related equipment? How might overhead powerlines interfere with the camera rig, or is that perfect warehouse both sound- and weather-proof to

ensure there is limited background noise and that no one is electrocuted on a rainy day? Where is there room for base camp, craft services, and toilets?

Here we get our first sense of how the respatialization of their work, alongside the advent of new technology, has transformed this practice. Historically, there was a bit of creativity and craftwork involved here: location experts went on scouting expeditions with their SLR cameras and rolls of 35mm film. Much like celluloid in the filmmaking process, rolls of 35mm film placed material limitations on how many images they could capture, and further required certain temporal considerations that location experts now regard with some nostalgia. As one location scout recounts to me with excitement, “It was such a rush when you knew you had to get to your roll of film to the photo store or at home if you did it yourself, so that it was developed in time for you to trim the edges, put together your panoramic displays, tape them to your folders or booklets before your presentation, and then go off to make that 4 pm meeting with the producer.”

There’s a semblance of craft here: the technical skill and creativity of photography, the scrapbook-like approach to the look-books, and the art of persuasive presentation to executives. It was handiwork, practiced overtime, honed for excellence. Yet, today, the process is increasingly different: location scouts are at much greater distances from producers, digital cameras have taken the place of 35mm film, the internet is home to millions of images from amateur vacation photographers, and the cloud has become the default archive of professional scouting images. These changes have had two immediate on location experts. First, the availability of images on the internet has displaced their professional and creative authority. Anyone on the production team is now a potential location scout by simply entering a few key search terms into Google Image. While location experts admit the internet also has made their job a bit easier—extensive desk research before a physical scout helps narrow down options—it also increases the burden of that task since the world is now at their fingertips, and producers or production designers can too easily disregard their colleague’s expertise and encourage them to “keep searching.”

Secondly, the cloud now offers an endless archive of images for producers to review at their leisure in place of the more personalized (and face-to-face) curation of what the location expert actually thinks are the best options for the production. Gone are the 4 pm meetings when location experts would decorate production offices with their display boards, and in collaboration with the director and production designer, engage in some tactile creativity: moving boards around, discarding unwanted options, and reorganizing preferred locations as they collectively narrowed down their filming sites. Today, this process increasingly occurs in isolation: the producer, director, or production designer quickly scrolls through a secure website on their own without much input from or collaboration with the locations experts. This is especially true when you are scouting locations in Budapest or the Gold Coast in Australia for a producer in London or Los Angeles. Again, another scout tells me, “I am on a helicopter taking images of the Great Barrier Reef around the Whitsunday Islands, and the producers will want me to send them those images before I’m out of the helicopter. Gone are the days of developing film and making look books. Now, I just hand over a USB stick, or more likely, load images onto a website, then send an email.” Similarly, many location experts are contending with the burden of excess information: rather than detailed

organizational systems to track images as part of their own professional archives, most location experts now have terabytes upon terabytes of images they store on numerous external hard drives with no meaningful way to organize and preserve that amount of information, which further erodes the cultivation and refinement of a certain skillset demanded by the job.

II. Complex Negotiations of Locations Work

Once the various stakeholders have agreed upon the necessary locations for a project, the location department's responsibilities become much more logistical and service oriented in nature. This work entails navigating what Michael Curtin and I have previously described as the "intricate and intimate matrix of social relations" that constitute craftwork today.¹ Static conceptions of class relations between management and labor – or even between producer, talent, and crew—simply fail to appreciate the elaborate network of social ties that were made apparent to us in our research. Location experts provide further evidence of this dynamic. Indeed, one of the most pressing conundrums I'm trying to negotiate in this research is how we best make sense of a location expert's labor, which, as I suggested earlier, seems to exceed the explanatory purchase of "just" craft or creativity. Locations are a fundamental requirement of most motion pictures, a statement so obvious that the contribution location experts make to the production process risks being overlooked and underappreciated. Yet, they are an integral member of the creative team whose contributions directly shape the look and feel of the final motion picture or television series. They share intimate working relationships with producers, directors, and production designers, and they possess a deep, comprehensive knowledge of each department's creative and technical needs, especially the lighting department, camera department, and the electrical department. Listening to them recall the innumerable variables they consider when scouting locations makes me think of listening to mathematician rehearse extremely complex "if, then" formulas.

Locations work is especially compelling because they are uniquely positioned within the temporal and spatial division of labor in two distinct ways. First their job is to make spaces available to the production for filming. They begin work on filming sites days, sometimes even weeks, before the crew shows up. In this sense, they are more autonomous and exist outside the daily production schedules that constitute their colleague's work worlds. If the filming takes place over four days, the location schedule both buffers and overlaps with the shooting schedule. Furthermore, schedules for each location overlap and run simultaneously alongside each other. Location experts, then, are more mobile, constantly moving from one location to the next and back again as they work to make and remake space – to open up geography – for the production. This is especially true during the scouting phase when location experts often work alone and according to their own day-to-day deadlines. Second the locations department is the most public facing department of a production. A locations manager serves as the production's face in meetings with local governments, public agencies, housing authorities, private businesses, residents, and in many cases, local press. Given the internal and external pressures location managers face, they often speak about their position within a production in liminal terms. They "*walk a fine line*" between, on the one hand, the creative needs of the director and production designer and, on the other, the

¹ Michael Curtin and Kevin Sanson (2017) Listening to Labor in *Voices of Labor: Craft, Creativity, and Conflict in Global Hollywood*, Michael Curtin, and Kevin Sanson (Eds) Berkeley: UC Press, p. 5.

concerns of external stakeholders, like property owners or transportation authorities. They are the only crew member who must “*deal with both the fantasy and reality*” of a production, meaning they contribute not only to the production’s fictional world, but also contend with its material impact in the real world. It also means they understand, intimately, what happens when “*the circus invades someone’s backyard.*” As one locations expert told me, “It’s really hard for a homeowner to understand the scale of what we’re trying to do. I have to translate the enormity of the process and make them aware of what might go wrong when we’re filming. It also makes me the person who they see as singular accountable for this whole thing.”

I am interested in how we best make sense of this liminal position, especially with respect to the pressures upon location experts to serve the disparate objectives of multiple stakeholders, both internal and external to the production. In public or private spaces requires an immense amount of bureaucratic maneuvering on the part of location experts who must negotiate permits and permissions with a range of external parties: business owners, local residents, municipal authorities, state authorities, public transport officials, rubbish bin collectors, port-o-loo providers, private security firms, police and fire squads, among many others. They need permission to redecorate storefronts, fire semiautomatic weapons in residential neighborhoods, reroute public foot traffic through the inner city, and facilitate road closures on major interstate thoroughfares. Oftentimes, they are negotiating such objectives near major historical sites, like the Charles Bridge in Prague, or in heavily populated areas, like a major intersection in Brisbane’s Central Business District or an inner-city subway stop in Budapest. Moreover, these processes are not uniform around the world, meaning location experts face a learning curve every time they venture into a new region for the very first time.

Location experts spend a great deal of time in meetings explaining the process of filmmaking to individuals with little existing knowledge other than what they get from the romanticized discourses that circulate so widely. Remember, this is not Southern California where Hollywood has historically constituted part of the economic and cultural fabric of the city. Again, one of my interviewees recalls the experience of knocking on neighborhood doors: “At first, they don’t believe you (that you work for a film production). Secondly, they don’t really understand what I’m trying to explain to them or what I am asking them to agree to let us do in their neighborhood.” Of course, this logically leads to suspicion – they have to sign forms after all – and an incredible burden on location experts’ interpersonal skills and capacity for effective communication. It’s a tenuous part of the process that threatens the overall endeavor if residents are riled or miscommunication circulates. This is a client-focused mode of labor in which location experts work to unite disparate agendas around a common goal: a professional standard that is repeatedly described to me as a “seamlessness of experience.” The emphasis here is to ensure the production remains a minimally disruptive experience for everyone potentially impacted by its presence. Location experts employ various tactics to facilitate acquiescence, and some of the more interesting responses include hiring local residents to simply stand around the perimeter of a production location to explain what’s happening to their friends and neighbors.

Of course, the client-service metaphor extends to internal managerial agents as well, like executive producers, directors, and production designers who hold key positions within these power dynamics. The singularity of their creative visions – and often, their whatever-it-takes mentality – can strain the financial and human resources of the locations department. It also often jeopardizes the logistical capacity of any given location, which can threaten the safety of the crew, harmonious relations with local communities, and the overall sustainability of the location itself by simply destroying it or creating political, social, or environmental circumstances that prohibit its ongoing use by future productions. In such precarious circumstances a simple ‘no’ is not a permissible response. The goal, remember, is to ensure these productions have a seamless experience when they setup in places like Budapest or the Gold Coast in Australia. Impediments, like hearing ‘no’ or contending with disgruntled politician or residents that disrupt production, limit prospects in the region for returning business. Disproportionate power dynamics notwithstanding, location experts also must appease other stakeholders as well. Fellow crewmembers, for instance, are quick to express dissatisfaction if the location poses exceptional difficulty or challenges to their work routines. Location experts know they need to make sure base camp is not too far from the shooting site, which has become increasingly difficult given the exceptionally large geographic footprint of major productions.

In short, it’s a tough job that serves many different masters but it’s also incredibly insightful when we use these experiences to reframe our understanding of certain film and television labor in the global era. The majority of locations work is invisible, intangible, interactive, and performative, focused on producing an experience in which success – a job well done – is determined by the seamless coordination of disparate needs and agendas. Furthermore, there is a strong correlation here to the emotional labor performed by service workers. Location workers put an excessive amount of work into explaining, comforting, assuring, assuaging, convincing, supporting, and even apologizing. It’s not uncommon to hear location managers discuss “friendships” they’ve developed with certain property owners over time as a consequence of repeat use of their locations. Yet, these interactions are exacerbated by the fact that the tripartite relationship between manager, worker, and client is made even more complex by the excessive matrix of asymmetrical social relations that location workers must navigate. Yet, through those external engagements in particular, location workers increasingly bring outside parties – from politicians and police to local neighbors and business owners – into the production itself. Access to location is bought by the production but the treatment of those who give permission is a key part of that exchange, much like the treatment of spa clients or hotel guests is a component of what is bought and sold in luxury service work. Location workers themselves often disappear into the background of the very processes they help facilitate in the first instance: intentionally invisible, unnoticed, and unremarkable unless something goes awry. Service work, after all, rarely draws attention to itself unless the service is unsatisfactory.

Business Models of the Commercial Creative Industries: a New Direction?

Abstract

In recent decades advances in ICT and changes in consumer behaviour have been so revolutionary that they pose serious challenges to conventional business models; the issue is no longer copyright infringement on its own, which the industry and copyright law have attempted to eradicate, but how the industries respond to the changes of the market and find reliable revenue streams.

As a result of these changes, it now looks as if creative content of all kinds—made by professionals, amateurs and fans—is less a good sold directly or indirectly to people for the value of information, entertainment and leisure, but it functions more as a hook to attract masses of consumers or selected segments of consumers with specific attributes and interest for advertisers to target.

These changes in business models, globally observed, are tremendous, but have not been much discussed as an aggregate, although they have great implications for the creative industries policy. Searle (2011) is a useful start, but the case studies are about business expansion rather than the analysis into more fundamental changes that are occurring with the rise of global IT giants (Amazon, Facebook, Google and Apple). This paper will examine such changes in relation to their impact on the strategies of the commercial creative industries with a focus on creative production and marketing.

Bio

Nobuko Kawashima, formerly Research Fellow, Centre for the Study of Cultural Policy, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK; now Department of Economics, Doshisha University, Kyoto, author of *Museum Management in a Time of Change: Impacts of Cultural Policy on Museums in Britain, 1979–1997* (1997) and *The Making of A Programme Diary: A Study into the Programming of Arts Presentation at Arts Centres in Britain* (1998) and several journal articles.

Session 2 | Thursday afternoon

Chair: Darrell William Davis (Visual Studies, Lingnan University)

Aynne Kokas (Media Studies, University of Virginia)

Platform Patrol: China, the United States, and the Global Battle for Data Security

Abstract

China has the largest potential market for digital platforms in the world. Global technology firms like Microsoft and Apple already depend on their sales in China. Other firms like Netflix, Facebook, and Amazon have made significant compromises with Chinese corporate partners and Chinese government regulators that they have been unwilling to make in other markets around the world. In parallel, the US corporate interests have taken the lead in making technology policy, ensuring market-driven policies that fail to protect citizens from the vulnerabilities of large troves of personal consumer data stored on corporate servers as demonstrated by the hacks of Equifax, Anthem Healthcare, and Target. In combination, the lack of consumer protections in the US and the increasing global influence of Chinese national technology policy pose a potent long-term risk.

The US-China technology policy relationship has already proven problematic for consumers seeking to navigate the borders of their digital lives. Immediately following China's 2017 Cybersecurity Law, which required key data generated in the PRC to be stored within the country, Apple agreed to a cloud computing joint venture with a majority stake held by Guizhou Yunshang, a company funded by the Chinese provincial government of Guizhou. In January 2018, users in the US with US-based Apple IDs reported receiving notifications that their data was being migrated onto Chinese servers. Moreover, Chinese users whose data had previously been stored on Apple servers also had a forced data migration. Unlike governments and corporations, consumers typically do not develop or control their own proprietary platforms, and are thus subject to the standards of institutional stakeholders in terms of how their data is stored, secured, and circulated. This means that consumers around the world are caught within a web of international institutional data gathering and sharing. *Border Patrol on the Digital Frontier: China, the United States, and the Global Battle for Data Security* argues that because of its failure to regulate US tech companies' operations abroad and Chinese tech companies' operations in the US, the United States is ceding global authority over a vitally important and under-regulated resource: user data generated by commercial platforms.

Bio

Aynne Kokas is an assistant professor of media studies at the University of Virginia. Kokas' work focuses on the intersections between Chinese and US media and technology industries. Her book, *Hollywood Made in China* (University of California Press 2017), examines the cultural, political and economic implications of US media investment in China as it becomes the world's largest film market. *Hollywood Made in China* has been profiled or cited publications in seven languages and forty-two countries. Kokas' research on China's media industry has also appeared or is forthcoming in publications including *PLOS One*, *Global Media and Communication*, *The Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Communication*, and *In Media Res*.

Platform Patrol: China, the United States, and the Global Battle for Data Security

Aynne Kokas

Introduction

In this piece, I argue that China creates digital borders that push US technology firms to allow Chinese regulators access to private corporate and individual user data, even though Chinese firms would not make similar agreements with regulators in the United States. This behavior demonstrates the extension of Chinese “cybersovereignty” into US corporate governance. For the purposes of scholars of the media industries – this suggests the need to move our research into a new domain: security.

China articulated its policy of “cybersovereignty” early on:

“The Internet sovereignty of China should be respected and protected... China maintains that all countries have equal rights in participating in the administration of the fundamental international resources of the Internet and a multilateral and transparent allocation system should be established on the basis of the current management mode, so as to allocate those international resources of the Internet, and a multilateral and transparent allocation system should be established on the basis of the current management mode, so as to allocate those resources in a rational way and to promote the balanced development of the global Internet industry (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2010).”

Media platforms like the App Store operated by Apple already depend on their sales in China. Other firms like Netflix, Cisco, and Amazon have made significant compromises with Chinese corporate partners and Chinese government regulators to enter the market (Russell 2017). In the United States, Silicon Valley corporate interests have taken the lead in making technology policy, ensuring access to large troves of personal consumer data with scant responsibility for protecting it, as demonstrated by the hacks of Equifax, Anthem Healthcare, and Target. In combination, the lack of consumer protections in the United States and the increasing global influence of Chinese national technology policy pose a potent long- term risk. Because of its failure to regulate US tech companies’ operations, the US government is forgoing oversight over a precious resource: user data generated by commercial media platforms.

US consumer platforms that seek to operate in China are simultaneously unaccountable to the US government and in debt to the Chinese government. User data, the type gathered by social media sites, online video portals, “smart” appliances, payment apps, and the other platforms that shape our digital lives, is highly valuable as a tool both for creating reliable commercial algorithms and for surveillance. And yet this valuable resource is caught in limbo between internal corporate servers (both US and Chinese), Chinese government efforts to nationalize data storage, and international government surveillance efforts. The asymmetry in technology policy between the US and China—a laissez-faire attitude on the part of US regulators contrasting with China’s self-interested draconian restrictions—is giving China authority over one of the most under-regulated resources of the twenty-first century: data.

The US strategy of deferring to Silicon Valley in technology policymaking – supporting disruption while limiting regulation – may spur domestic innovation in the US. However, it has left

both US companies and global consumers vulnerable to Chinese government efforts to control global data. China, in other words, is shaping the global circulation and security of commercial data by taking advantage of the blind spots in US regulations.

US Data Regulations

Though the United States played an active role in the development of the Internet, it has taken a laissez-faire approach to regulating companies and the data they generate. US firms have the freedom not only to gather consumer data, but to evade punishment if they mismanage it, and other consumer platforms. US domestic consumer data security practices pertaining to government and commercial platforms are limited.

It is not surprising, then, that Chinese technology companies encounter a comparatively open digital environment in the United States. Chinese firms can still raise capital by selling shares and listing initial public stock offerings on US capital markets (Kokas 2014). Chinese social media, video, and payment platforms are already accessible in the United States. While such policies are the result of decisions at the national level, they have both global consequences for the international tech industry and local impacts on individual consumers.

In response to perceived vulnerabilities related to Chinese technology investment in the United States, the US government is attempting to control Chinese investment in US firms through a national security-oriented committee in the Department of the Treasury, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS has serious limitations. The Committee has jurisdiction over forthcoming full acquisitions, but little to no oversight over acquisitions that have already been approved. The CFIUS process has blocked only a few Chinese technology acquisitions, and does not apply at all to a wide range of transactions, including partial acquisitions and joint ventures. With limited oversight over foreign investment in US tech platforms, the US is now finding itself having to oversee not just cybersecurity risks from foreign entities, but also cybersecurity risks related to companies based in the United States.

Technology Policy in China

China's technology policy demands trade-offs from US companies, often in ways consumers and regulators might find objectionable if they had full knowledge of them. China's cybersecurity law requires all critical information (broadly defined) to be stored on Chinese-owned servers. As a result, any foreign companies dealing with critical information must establish a domestic joint venture partnership (Clarice Yue 2017). In joint ventures, information sharing is treated as an internal corporate matter. Therefore, intellectual property or data privacy violations that would previously have been protected under the US-China Cybersecurity Agreement (2015), a landmark agreement against hacking foreign corporate interests between the US and Chinese governments, become internal Chinese corporate matters, among other risks. The move to require joint ventures shapes data management practices in such a way that international data falls under the internal corporate regulation of Chinese companies, thus further shifting oversight to Chinese regulators.

Consumer Risk, National Risk

By failing to closely oversee commercial data security, the US government is not just putting consumers at risk, but also providing vulnerable targets for Chinese military exploits. In 2014, soldiers from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) allegedly hacked US companies for the

benefit of Chinese companies. The intersection of the military and the commercial in the landscape of technology development created strategic risks for not just Chinese and US companies, but for the Chinese and US militaries, particularly with regard to the question of appropriate responses to military attacks on consumer technologies.

The US-China Cyber Agreement in which both governments agreed to “refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of [corporate] intellectual property” (Congressional Research Service 2015) leaves significant challenges unaddressed. For example, definitions of intellectual property typically cover the structure of databases, but not necessarily the privacy of the user-generated data within those databases.

Most significantly, the US-China Cybersecurity Agreement applies only to foreign corporations. Partially-owned companies or joint ventures present a challenge to the protections inscribed in the agreement. Chinese-owned companies do not have the same protection against the theft of intellectual property from the Chinese government. By increasing the amount and type of data stored in Chinese-owned data centers, China has structured its laws in such a way that it has decreased the number of firms and amount of data stored under Chinese government jurisdiction. Ultimately, increased Chinese acquisitions render much of the agreement moot, creating an increased cybersecurity risk for US technology companies with Chinese investment.

Trade, national security, and consumer data are all tied up together. As the 2014 Sony hack so clearly demonstrated, the cybersecurity risk is just as, if not more, complicated than strictly military attacks when it involves the data of corporations and individuals. China, for example, maintains a policy of “Comprehensive National Power,” a strategy for incorporating consumer and military risks into its overall national security policy. The US, by contrast, balkanizes consumer data regulation into the departments of homeland security and defense, as well as the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communication Commission. The lack of comprehensive policymaking with regard to data creates gaps in oversight.

Individual corporations are responsible for maintaining their own cybersecurity enforcement teams. Making corporations responsible for their cybersecurity presents a clear national security risk. US CEOs have demonstrated repeatedly that they are willing to provide Chinese government officials with access to their platforms in exchange for market access. From Tim Cook’s keynote speech at the Chinese government’s 2017 Internet summit to Mark Zuckerberg’s multiple meetings with China’s former Internet Czar Lu Wei, US CEOs have demonstrated no appetite for pushing back against the demands of the Chinese government if such pushback would affect their potential to operate in the market (Arsène 2016).

The US-China technology policy relationship has already proven problematic for consumers seeking to navigate the borders of their digital lives. For example, immediately following the implementation of China’s 2017 Cybersecurity Law requiring the key data generated in the PRC to be stored in the PRC, Apple agreed to be the minority partner in a cloud computing joint venture with a majority stake held by Guizhou Yunshang, a company funded by the Chinese provincial government of Guizhou. In January 2018, Apple moved the data of China-based users whose data had previously been stored on Apple servers to Guizhou Yunshang-controlled servers. Some users with US-based Apple IDs reported receiving notifications that their data was also being moved (Russell 2018). Unlike governments and corporations, consumers typically do not develop or control their own proprietary platforms, and are thus subject to the decisions of more powerful stakeholders. Consumers around the world are caught within a web of Sino-US institutional data gathering, sharing, and distributing.

In 2017, Apple was one of the first firms to build a new joint venture data center in China in order to comply with China's cybersecurity law of the same year. The law, as mentioned above, requires all firms that maintain "critical information infrastructure" to store their data on a Chinese-owned server. Apple, like many foreign firms operating in China, relies heavily on data centers to operate within the Chinese market. However, for Apple, as for many other firms in areas ranging from engineering services to enterprise computing, the decision to open a data center held with major ownership by a Chinese firm transforms the politics of power and access to data within the company and in its relations with consumers. China's cybersecurity law and the related technology regulatory framework will fundamentally transform both the ownership and the circulation of data not only within China, but for all global companies that operate in China. By regulating the security issues presented by global corporate data investments, China is establishing new global standards for the data trade. The laissez-faire policies of the US protect neither consumers nor national competitiveness.

Indeed, the behavior of US tech giants reveals the increasingly prominent role that Chinese government regulations are taking. Take the example of the 2017 Wuzhen World Internet Conference, a global conference organized by the Chinese government to discuss Internet products and policy. Wuzhen is a hot ticket. Governments (and corporations) from around the world send representatives there – if they can get in. In 2017, executives from major US corporations had to wait for approval from Chinese organizers to attend, and could not just buy tickets. US regulators, by contrast, were invited and chose not to attend.

However, US corporations actively participated in the conference. CEOs from both Apple and Google attended. Tim Cook, Apple's CEO, even spoke at the conference. During Cook's speech, he reiterated the need for privacy, security, and decency (Newsroom December 4, 2017). But the simple language of Cook's speech failed to address the divergent standards his company upholds for its different regional offices. Apple has agreed to turn over user data to Chinese government servers and start a Chinese provincial government-run data storage center. Yet in 2015, Apple refused to turn over the passcode for even one user in the United States during the San Bernardino terrorist attacks. The company's divergent policies in the United States and China relate directly back to Apple's concern for market share and access.

At the World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, the US government presence was conspicuously absent, not because US regulators couldn't participate, but because they were choosing not to. Like US decisions to step back from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, skipping the Wuzhen World Internet Conference signals that the US is stepping back from participation in global technical governance organizations, even as China is becoming more important for the future of the United States, politically, economically and militarily.

Compounding the decision to step back from regional governance organizations is the US's decision to step back from technical leadership in areas ranging from cybersecurity to data localization to digital sovereignty. The United States has taken an increasingly siloed approach to Internet governance, relying heavily on private corporations to secure their own data and the military to handle military cybersecurity, while doing almost nothing to bridge the gap between civilian and military data security or infrastructure regulation. By contrast, China is establishing clear new frameworks for data storage and security that impact private corporations, Chinese state-owned enterprises, and government agencies operating in China and globally.

The US has not always been so passive in technology policymaking. For many years, it was criticized for being overly dominant in the field of Internet governance. ICANN relied on US government resources to assign domain name servers to global internet infrastructure. DARPA was a driving factor behind the development of the Internet in the first place.

And yet, with the emergence of China's ever-growing market and bureaucratic framework, we are seeing increased patrolling by Chinese regulators of platforms, as well as the increasing influence of China's data storage and circulation practices.

As shown by the case of Apple's maneuvers in the context of China's new Internet governance frameworks, the patrolling of platforms around the world is becoming the domain of powerful corporations and authoritarian governance. This is a radical transformation of Internet cybersecurity practices, and speaks to the emergence of a new frontier of media industries studies: security.

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Kristian Feigelson (Film Studies, University of the Sorbonne Nouvelle)

The Film Factory: Boundaries in Media Industry

Abstract

In proposing an analysis of the professionalization and the occupations of cinema based on the discoveries of interactionist sociology, *The Filmic Factory* defines film practices in concrete terms. Taking a look at the other side of the scenery allows us to understand different processes.

This paper addresses film culture and business market, will first examine different forms of evolutions and tendencies in cinema industry. In the age of globalization, could a new map be traced to better understand cultural and political dilemmas as well as why production flows have shifted to Asia? What can be said of the rapid rise of cultural product industries, or the reasons of their dominant- but not exclusive- location in major global part of the world?

These concepts of creative industries and economy are fraught with controversy, challenging cultural policies. Drawing on concrete analyses carried out in various studios, this paper considers filmic delocalizations, filmmaking processes and organization of the labor market from a global perspective in order to grasp the interior processes of a film's fabrication. If creative industry is reliant on the necessary transformation of artists and creators, can its boundaries be defined?

How to describe these different categories of audiovisual and film occupations over a long period of time through the lens of more complex professional constructions, at the intersection of French public policy since 1936 and current evolutions in an European market based on intermittent employment?

On the basis of numerous inquiries in various studios (mainly in France and Central Europe, but also in the United States, India, Russia ...), this work proposes a new perspective on this specific work market in the context of globalization, in order to better understand the anonymous history of those who have created cinema.

Bio

Kristian Feigelson, sociologist, professor in film studies at the University of the Sorbonne Nouvelle. He collaborates on several reviews and has published numerous works on *Cinema business* (ed Nathan, Paris, 2000), *Bollywood: Images industry* (Théorème 16, PSN, Paris, 2012).

The Film Factory: Boundaries in Media Industry

Work paper / from *The Filmic Factory [La Fabrique Filmique]*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2011.

Kristian Feigelson

1. The Relevance of an Organizational Model

How can we explore beyond a socio-economic understanding of reality, based on organizational models of technicians, to decipher the forms of mediation practiced in the professional domain around the pivotal role of the production manager?

How to understand the real economy of the world of work which unfolds in globalized work markets? This economy moves relatively uniformly or similarly across different work markets, thanks to a strong international tradition unique to careers in cinema¹. This system of a cinema without borders is based on an already venerable tradition².

How can we comprehend the whole process made up of fragmentary observations that come from a great variety of situations in which these shared forms of work are appropriated during studio shooting? A film set is a space created for different uses and from a world of differentiated activity³. In the framework of institutionalized management, paradoxically, the set resembles the workshop layout of an atelier⁴. Although the set constitutes the essential locus of redistributed disseminated information, we may ask ourselves how this information circulates within the micronetworked filmic enterprise⁵.

This perspective of the “reproducible organizational model” does not claim to detail exhaustively the entire branch’s functioning, but it could help to explain certain aspects of the professionalization process in the cinema and more generally in the work market.

Workers’ groups, no matter the studio visited, mainly traffic in the cultural model of traditional cinema, which remains potent if not mythic. The perspective adopted here delineates the particularities of certain labor markets and updates certain endogenous determining factors, as well as exogenous ones intrinsic to the labor market and the ferocious competition in film making.

This perspective helps us understand the dynamic of activity in the cinema industry by describing the logic of these different interactions in film shoots. Can we understand in greater depth the organization of this establishment and the cyclical yet variable interpenetration of work markets? In France, an understanding of technical occupations’ evolution, based on the public policy regulating them, is necessary context⁶. The history of these occupations is, in fact, multifaceted (institutional, political, economic aspects, etc.) -- unlike in Hollywood, where the deciphering of

¹ Cf. Kristian Feigelson « Cinéma sans frontières » chapter *Le Territoire sous influence T/2*, Dominique Pagès and Nicolas Pelissier, éditions L’Harmattan, Paris 2001, pp. 249-267.

² Cf. Roland Cosandey and François Albera (dir), *Cinéma sans frontières 1896-1919, aspect de l’internationalité dans le cinéma mondial: représentations, marchés, influences et réception*, Payot / Nuit Blanche, Lausanne- Québec, 1995.

³ Cf. In term of device, Yves Cohen, « Une usine, deux écritures » in *Lieux de travail*, CCI, Paris, 1986, pp.28-37.

⁴ Cf. Eliott Freidson « les professions artistiques comme défi à l’analyse sociologique » in *Revue Française de sociologie*, XXVII/3, juillet-septembre 1986. Raymonde Moulin « De l’artisan au professionnel: l’artiste » in *Sociologie du travail*, 4/1983, p 388-403.

⁵ Cf Howard Becker, *The nature of a profession. Education for a profession*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962 and *Art worlds*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982.

⁶ Cf. Colin Crisp, *The Classic French Cinema 1930-1960*, Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 1994.

activities today is linked differently to the production of massively delocalized films, or Bollywood, an alternative model with overabundant sources of labor and an essentially national market⁷.

The collective aspect of cinema and its workflow according to project have a direct impact on the division of labor and on the symbolic hierarchy of different participants in the chain of command. From a functional point of view, the division of labor seems relatively flexible on the set, demanding a certain versatility from the individuals chosen by the production manager.

2. A Work System

The idea of “activity” assumes its specific meaning in the context of the specific work apparatus, confined to the studio setting. Based in this bounded apparatus, exterior shoots may also take place. Producers today may choose from a range of available exterior locations which allow them to reconstitute historical or contemporary settings. The delocalized studio is a strategic area wherein a major portion of professional activity is accomplished. The earliest cinema anticipated the first studios in factory courtyards (in Montreuil, for example) where filming took place half of the time on open-air sites⁸. Méliès created his film sets in a hangar. With the advent of the talkie 1929, the beginning of the 1930s saw the introduction of temporary work for sound technicians and managers, who worked in studios newly equipped for audio. This kind of work was regularized with the labor agreement of cinematographic production, signed in 1937. Workers, still employed by production studios, would be hired as permanent employees until the practice changed in the 1960s⁹. But studios never truly fully assured full-time work for its labor force, nor the constant usage of its installations. The chronic instability of production meant that the productivity resulting from the use of the sets was not guaranteed. In the 1960s, fiction films were still shot for an average of 8 to 10 weeks, including 6 weeks in the studio. Each shoot required a crew of 70 to 80 people, with the exception of productions with large built sets, which sometimes necessitated 150 supplemental workers—thence the importance attributed in the postwar years to construction workers in film. These numbers diminished after 1970, when film shoots were shortened to 6 weeks and the crews lessened by half. The number of shoots grew after 1980, but their length was further shortened to 4 weeks. Meanwhile the number of qualified technicians and holders of the Professional Identity Card also diminished, although without affecting the elite technicians, usually supervisors protected from productions’ periodic fluctuations and reincorporated into their respective roles at each cycle.

From its origins, the cinematographic industry in Europe was characterized by small crews that usually operated as a network. If the term “temporary worker” was not yet commonly used in the 1920s to describe a specific professional category, the studios of the time employed a large, unstable labor force with distinct salary levels. Little by little, cinematographic companies turned to a form of production controlled by the producer and thus benefiting from a more precise localization. But the idea of the “studio-system” defining the idea of an apparatus in a specific place and on a bounded territory still appeared an innovative concept, which would later be reinvented. This was halfway between the craftsman’s studio and the semi-industrial workshop. In France, this type of incorporated studio predominated until 1914, after which it persisted until the end of the silent era. It would experience a rebirth with the talkie after 1929 and the golden age of

⁷ Cf Emmanuel Grimaud, *Bollywood Film Studio*, CNRS, Paris, 2004, describing how in Mumbai 200 000 persons are working in the studios.

⁸ Cf. Laurent Mannoni, « Les studios Pathé de la région parisienne (1896-1914) » in Laurent LeForestier et Michel Marie (dir), *La firme Pathé Frères (1896-1914)*, AFRHC, 2004.

⁹ Janine Ranou in « les métiers artistiques du spectacle vivant et leurs catégorisations » in *Les professions et leurs sociologies. Modèle théorique, catégorisation, évolution*, Pierre-Michel Menger (dir), MSH, Paris, 2003, pp 88-92.

the studio system, integrating laboratory outbuildings¹⁰. But this specific form almost disappeared after the Second World War, only surviving elsewhere, notably in Central Europe. After 1950, a new itinerant layout, more technical in its use of contractors, became the dominant model. The internationalized film industry diversified while accelerating this de-territorializing process, adopting in the 1960s certain practices of coproduction and joint financing of films in order to reduce shooting costs by producing in countries more advantageous financial structures¹. In the cinema, these strategies took specific forms: they combined microeconomic factors with macroeconomic exigencies, not always transposable from one system of production to another—all the more so, considering that each film remained in a prototype economy, obeying particular imperatives of production and post-production.

The studio set constitutes a confined temporal-spatial framework where subjective and objective aspects of the shoot are in play¹¹. From this point of view, there are no great variations from one set to another, unless one counts an extreme diversity in interpersonal relations, either through the pre-existing professional networks or through more informal rapports².

We may form several conclusions from these factors. The organization of a shoot unfolds around two functional poles which reveal group or individual styles:

- The set and technicians, in a strict organizational form
- The triad of the director of production/ producer/ director, a more complicated rapport in the form of an on-and-off collaboration.

These two poles express the collective and individual dimensions of technicians' work. The film factory appears as a heterogeneous apparatus that can be deconstructed according to multiple parameters: in its semi-industrial economic aspect, it often resembles a construction site while the set machinery recalls the workshop in its traditional form. From the point of view of the technicians, or their unions, the idea in French cinema of technical (or even artisan) expertise endures.

The number of informal, real and essential interactions depends on a network of relationships that often lack a clear definition. Of course, the forms of collaboration settled in advance, endorsed by the budget, allow the organization of the shoot. But the financial parameters are distinct from the practices put into play on a set from day to day. These practices are based on personal arrangements. Living together for a more or less long duration induces the creation of complex organizational forms, breaking the barrier between private and public life: a mix that is tolerated if not always fully accepted. Different occupation classes in apparent proximity are confronted with the factors and demands inherent to each, with the decisions of supervisors, but also with the unpredictability and urgency of certain situations.

The director, protected from observation, in the closed space of the set or studio. This limited, organized framework influences the attitudes of the whole crew. Requiring an organization logistic, it is currently evolving (in the context of often expanding budgets) towards more and more elaborate forms that may include concomitant postproduction and the growing use of new information technologies. The studio materializes the system of the division of labor. The autonomy of each participant is relative. Absolute independence only exists in very specific conditions; it essentially is only found during the screenwriting stage. This autonomy also depends

¹⁰ Cf Pierre Jean Benghozi and Bertrand Nicolas, « les stratégies des studios de cinéma » in revue *XX éme siècle*, 46/ avril-juin 1995.

¹¹ Erving Goffman, *les cadres de l'expérience*, éd Minuit, Paris, 1991 (*Frame analysis*, Harper and Row, London, 1974).

on the contractual relationship with the studio, which implies the screenwriter's short-term obligations to extensive services according to the film's needs. In this context, varying professional expectations may contradict one another. Other agents outside of the shooting crews ensure the services indispensable to the regular functioning of the studio.

The studio, followed by the shooting set, become in themselves the agents of other complication. They contribute to the structure of the mediation system between the director and the actors, technicians and (less visibly) laboratories, between the studio chiefs and the production, and between the range of assistants and their supervisors. At this level, the production manager is the key figure tasked with coordinating the employees' work according to the general goals of the film. The continuity supervisor, who must store and memorize all the information relating to the footage filmed, is also an important resource for the director. However, in a television studio, she is also in charge of the cue sheet. How can we understand the arrangement of all these relationships?

The fixed-quota aspect of the studio in terms of space, localization, and organization reinforces the interdependence of one and all in the primary imperative of keeping to a budget schedule. However, each person's investment in the production varies according to his or her occupation. The gradual disappearance of many studios after 1960 in much of Europe reinforced the nomadic nature of the work force of technicians, who then as now took to relocating for opportunities to work on shoots.

These professions are defined not only by the marked division of labor preexisting in the market or by already functioning, interconnected networks, but also by a system of cooperation. This system has become a necessity, since there is a constant demand for complimentary, sometimes even competing technical specialties on the set (sound, lighting...)

The set partially updates this vast system of organized relational networks, wherein most agents are meant to reinforce the triangular power structure of the director (in relative isolation), the producer (from a distance) and the production manager (both on the set and in the office). This apparatus is also subject to many professional routines¹.

Here, we are far from a "Fordist" industrial organizational model seen in Hollywood studios, where qualified workers employed in production depended directly on the administration in a vertical structure of tasks¹². Hollywood studios in the outskirts of Los Angeles functioned on a vertically integrated model. They took the concept of the late nineteenth-century industrial factory: hangars or barracks designed for industrial production, generally protected from outside eyes and under camera surveillance. This model was later developed and spread from parts of Europe to as far away as India, where from 1930 on Bollywood studios borrowed these same concepts for the northern periphery of Bombay. In most of these contexts, on-site training and partnership-style education encouraged autodidact workers and technicians to learn on the job. In these studios, the status of technician does not imply a specific training, except in the case of the cameraman/head operator and the sound crew members who must possess a more substantial technical mastery. Here, we are closer to the semi-artisan than to the industrial model in the "Taylorian" sense of the term, as opposed to the large apparatuses of the American studios, now fallen into disuse, which at one time employed these professionals¹³.

¹² Cf. Douglas Gomery, *Hollywood studio system*, BFI, London, 1986.

¹³ Concerning the Fordist model, Delbert C Miller, *Industrial sociology*, Harper and Row, New-York 1964.

3. Work and delocalization

Anticipating the inflation of expenses, relocation has been transforming work relations in cinema sectors for the past twenty years. It has allowed certain producers to invest in larger markets (particularly in telefilms¹) and to territorialize their expenses by reducing production costs with cheaper work forces or more advantageous fiscal systems abroad¹⁴. For example, the opening of Central Europe after 1989 enabled the establishment of foreign film productions in studios well-known for their savoir-faire (Budapest, Bucharest, Prague, etc.) and located on city peripheries. Each production company operates according to its own strategy, depending on the economic opportunities of the moment. These types of relocation, despite the CNC's foundation of a tax credit and scale, have allowed companies to sidestep the implicit rules of competition. The advantages for professional activity vary according to context (lower salaries or reduced service costs in British studios, the absence of real "social" expenses in Portugal, various free services for film in Switzerland, etc.).

Barrandov Studio in Prague demonstrates the logic of the studio system, conceived as a model of optimal organization, although we may relativize this model via observations of work behavior. The studio has also become a center for delocalized work.

Considered as one of the most important studios in Europe, it has possessed a national monopoly on feature film production since the 1930s¹⁵. Funded and subsidized by the Czech government for nearly 70 years, saved from the destruction of the Second World War, Barrandov, located in the suburbs west of Prague, was progressively privatized at the beginning of the 1990s after the Velvet Revolution, to the great gain of a steel manufacturer from Ostrava, the *Moravian Steel Company*. Thanks to its numerous assets, the new *Barrandov Production Company* rapidly became a resource for producers. Located in the center of Europe and a hub of western relocations, it derives its dominance from a strategic bet on the film market after 1993. In the context of exacerbated competition, Barrandov mainly attracts productions based in Hollywood, but also hosts some productions from Europe thanks to a quality-price ratio more enticing than those of its neighbor studios in Central Europe (*Mafilm* in Budapest, *Babelsberg* in Berlin, etc.). These studios offer a differential of salary costs that are very advantageous in Europe (40% of expenses) and a highly qualified technical labor force for the whole range of technical industry. (An average technician receives a fee of 3000 crowns or 100 euros per day, compared to the average monthly salary of 700 euros in the Czech Republic). A Czech technician is hired for a shoot for a contract of 60 hours a week, equaling 12 hours a day, while his or her French counterpart expects a 35-hour work week with a 10% bonus for every 4 overtime hours. Coproduction shoots are generally in line with French working rights if the commissioning studio is French. Within equivalent work cultures, these differentials can cause deep antagonisms often worsened by cultural incomprehension between the crews (2/3 Czech, 1/3 other). This environment, defined by a collective bargaining agreement, applies the work code according to its own strategy and local opportunities during shoots generally shorter than 12 weeks. Between 1986 and 1990, cost inflation progressively drove productions from Budapest to Prague, where conditions are more favorable. The demand for cost-effectiveness therefore is no longer dominant. However, Barrandov Studios continues to operate services for Czech television productions. At the outskirts of Prague, the 8 studios for film

¹⁴ Cf. Kristian Feigelson, chapter 9, « les enjeux de la délocalisation » in *Le cinéma et l'argent*, Laurent Creton (dir), Nathan, Paris, 1999, pp 141-152.

¹⁵ Cf. Kristian Feigelson « Au delà du rideau, le cinéma en Europe centrale (1945-1995) » in *Cinéma et régimes autoritaires au XX^e siècle*, (dir) Thomas Wieder/Pierre Sorlin, PUF-ENS, Paris, 2008, pp 145-165; see chapter II « Industry » in Dina Iordanova, *Cinema of the other Europe*, Wallflower Press, London, 2003; Pierre Sorlin, *European cinema, european societies (1939-1990)*, Routledge, London, 1991.

and television include 11 sets with a total surface of 10,000 square meters in a 25-hectare park. These studios have the advantage of a logistic integrating several departments (construction, costuming...) that unite all cinema technical occupations and supports within different divisions (postproduction laboratories, 5 digital sound laboratories, about 10 for lighting, 5 divisions for dubbing and editing...) In this way, Barrandov Studio has been transformed little by little into a service company with a source of permanent reinvestment, thanks to the changeovers conducted onsite with international coproductions. And so, since 1990, more than one hundred films and telefilms have been at least partly shot at Barrandov, of which 70% were large American studio productions from Warner, Universal, and Paramount, and 30% were European productions or coproductions¹⁶.

Each organization model of labor is determined by economic profiles of film shoots¹⁷. Films with higher budgets are characterized by large crews that require a greater division of labor, which creates a pressure for results if not for strong performance. A television series shoot for the 26-minute format needs several "multicamera" sets and augmented crews to ensure maximum productivity. The advent of high-cost digital technologies, the hike in fees paid to interpreters and authors (caused by more restricted casting options and more protective copyright), the inflation of marketing budgets, growing debt of producers, and the overbid investment by television companies have all been advanced as possible culprits to explain the rise in the average cost of French films observed for the past 20 years, as well as the difficulties encountered by small and medium-sized productions to finance their activity. This "cosmopolitan" cinema, with its multicultural origins (following the example of Hollywood's melting pot) does not share the same work experiences in specific organizational contexts where different studios function essentially according to the industrial workshop model and similar models.

This phenomenon, which predated the internationalization of cinema, is effective in localized employment areas where each network may tap into exchange relationships that have become much more flexible since 1993. Geographic proximity is one of the key elements that promote an internal network dynamic centered on a given center of production. It helps in effecting the circulation of information in a framework that may be extra-professional, within Barrandov as well as outside of it. The generalized use of the internet on the production site, thanks to specific software for organizing the workday and work stations, reinforces this system of augmented networks. The rapid circulation of information is an essential component in production activity. Within the center of these networks, the supervisors, hardware companies and different service providers take over the traditional tasks of the studio.

The cinema and audiovisual sector has created new relationships as much in the nature of the work as in its territory. The cinema has since its inception created its own work networks while ignoring frontiers. Mobile and nomadic, it eventually incorporated all manner of territory, all the more so since it was organized around geographic dispersion and a trans-frontier form of existence founded on innovation. In ten years, globalization had shaped economic archipelagos in which were concentrated a mixture of professional activities: like in Hollywood, placing these centers next to totally empty zones.

¹⁶ Cf Kristian Feigelson « Enjeux et perspectives du cinéma russe » in *L'internationalisation des productions cinématographiques et audiovisuelles*, Claude Forest (dir), Presses Universitaires Septentrion, Lille, 2017, pp 258-274.

¹⁷ Among these movies since 1984, *Amadeus* (Milos Forman), *Oliver Twist* (Roman Polanski), *Brothers Grimm* (Terry Gilliam), *Underground* (Emir kusturica), *Kafka* (Steven Söderbergh...etc

This globalization is a complex phenomenon which has grown at the end of the 1990s, but it is not reducible merely to the West¹⁸; we find its numerous effects in several aspects and interactions of the cinema sector, each time shaped by local contexts. Hollywood is no longer American, but a constellation of cosmopolitan skill as Warner Brothers gains footholds in Bombay's Bollywood. The modernity of this new "network" form of globalization, dubbed "glocalization," has major yet unpredictable effects in the cinema sector where, for example, a film (*Breaking the Waves*, 1996, Lars von Trier) may be the product of 18 producers of highly varied origins. Hollywood's old globalization strategy has led it to greater implication in different forms of localism.

Since the end of the 1990s, globalization has actively contributed to the development of greatly merchandized sectors (DVD sales, video games), the reorganization of hierarchies and the convergence of contents thanks to aggressive advances in the global distribution of images (in 2002, there were 1500 television channels in Europe compared to 150 in 1992). This globalization process contributes to local production and the emergence of new roles in all professional categories. At one extreme of this process, a film like *Slumdog Millionaire* can win an Oscar in Hollywood, which mobilizes a broad spectrum of participants (producer/distributors, press relations, critics, jury) while at the other end pirated copies of the film are already being sold on the sidewalks of Bombay, mobilizing a completely different set of intermediaries¹⁹.

The audiovisual sector's internationalization, which dates from Louis Lumiere's film trading posts at the beginning of the twentieth century, has intensified today under American domination. The United States hold 40% of the market, Australia and Canada 10%, Europe 30% and Asia (including Japan) about 10%. These markets, dominated by large multimedia groups and involved in transnational fusions, are diversifying their strategies in hopes of controlling the production sector and the distribution of images. This game of alliances allows them not only to control digital platforms, but also to buy film rights with a view to distribution. In this way, Canal+, the successor to the German group Kirsch, with almost 5000 films and 3300 hours of programming, has assembled one of the foremost European catalogs of audiovisual copyrights. The cinema sector is essential to the audiovisual and communications industries, yet constitutes a relatively small revenue impact. This is not without consequences for the evolution of employment, which has become trans-sectoral or more commercial in the majority of these sectors.

In the globalization framework, the audiovisual (non-cinema) sector represents 90%; cinema has become a minor share. It participates in the emergence and consolidation of four geo-financial centers which are exerting influence as much on work markets as on the future of the filmic industry. These consequences delineate four principle geographic centers of production/distribution, meant to amortize films with higher and higher budget over maximum territory. The Anglo-Saxon pole remains dominant, notably in the sector of the audiovisual market which represents more than \$225 billion dollars in terms of cash revenue divided up between large, leading conglomerates and major hirers.

A relatively centralized and self-contained Francophone area (with the exception of Canal +, which has become very internationalized since the development of its European studios, and despite the bad luck experienced by the Vivendi-Universal company in 2002-2004, which diversified into the telephone-internet market and publishing from its base in audiovisual and cinema. The company had at its inception specialized in water services in community areas as the General Water

¹⁸ Cf Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: cultural dimension of globalization*, University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis, 1996.

¹⁹ Tejaswini Ganti, *Producing Bollywood*, Duke University Press, Durham, 2012.

Company, spread out into cable television then into new technologies at the end of 1990). The public television companies grouped into the corporation France-Télévision are much smaller than the more open German companies. This center is shared between one company competing at the international level and a multitude of small, often innovative but scattered production companies²⁰. But unlike the American production center, few of these companies are capable of creating films for the global market. French cinema exports only about 1% of its total production of fiction.

A more flexible Austro-German area with free-exchange zones and the Babelsberg Studio at Potsdam, is notable for a certain perspicacity of its companies. There is a significant dynamic of audiovisual exchange (RTL, etc.). This geographic center represents a certain future for the audiovisual industry, striving to develop a telefilm economy that is easier to recycle and amortize thanks in part to regional aid. But unlike those of the United States, the European Union markets are still quite fragmentary in terms of production, distribution and operation. *Cinecitta*, symbol of the golden age of Italian cinema in Rome, has been privatized in order to focus essentially on audiovisual products, while Anglo-Saxon studios (Dublin/London) are developing delocalization strategies with American shoots.

An American center, which has always anticipated European strategies, reinvests its filmic production in secondary markets. It acts in a manner similar to its German competition, with integrated investment, based on the context enlarged by the globalization of operating markets and cinema distribution. Commercial action is often merely the extension of larger financial investment (45% of revenue for these major American companies comes from the international market). This is the case for European as well as Asian markets. Barrandov Studios (Prague) and Mafilm Studios (Budapest) have been figureheads for Hollywood for the past twenty years. Even though 60% of jobs remain concentrated in Los Angeles, we are witnessing new forms of “peripherization/ delocalization”²¹. Los Angeles and Toronto have become the crucial points of these massive changes²². Investments in delocalization explain the rebound in employment figures at the local level in commercial, rather than technical areas.

The last great center divides Asia into traditional production zones like India, essentially focused on a national market wherein Bollywood employs 200,000 people; Malaysia/Indonesia; and expanding centers in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China, which are seeking to establish economic parity across their different shooting sites in hopes of gaining a foothold in European markets.

India, for instance, has been delocalizing a portion of its big-budget Bollywood films to Australia, Switzerland and Thailand for the past five years²³. Large, industrious Indian companies such as *Reliance* have succeeded in diversifying their multimedia activities into a range of audiovisual fields. This has allowed them to invest in *Dreamworks Studios*, founded by Spielberg, and buy film catalogs from other major studios in the United States.

²⁰ Monique Dagnaud « exception culturelle » in *le Débat*, n°134, mars-avril 2005, pp 115-128.

²¹ Cf. Allen J Scott, *On Hollywood, the place, the industry*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2005.

²² John Caldwell, *Production culture: industrial reflexivity and critical practice in film and television*, Duke University Press, 2008. Miller T (dir) *Global Hollywood 2*, BFI, London, 2005.

²³ Camille Deprez, *Bollywood: cinéma et mondialisation*, Presses Universitaires Septentrion, Lille, 2010. Monique Dagnaud and Kristian Feigelson (dir) *Bollywood: industrie des images*, Presses Sorbonne nouvelle, Paris, 2012; Darrell William Davis and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh, *East Asian Screen industries*, BFI, London, 2008; Stephanie DeBoer, *Coproducing Asia, locating Japanese-Chinese regional film and media*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2014.

Six large corporations dominate the world film and television market, each supported by a cinema studio: the American conglomerates AOL (with Time Warner studios), ABC (with Disney and its subdivisions Dreamworks and Miramax), Viacom-CBS (Paramount), and Comcast/NBC (Universal); the Japanese company Sony with Columbia and a share in MGM; and the Australian Murdoch and NewsCorp multimedia conglomerate (press, television, cable, cinema, multimedia), which owns Twentieth Century Fox. All in all, they are present in four continents and 52 countries via a galaxy of 800 active companies. Hollywood has thus become a platform that is decentralizing its production on a massive scale to Mexico and Europe. Los Angeles has meanwhile remained a mythic place where some studios have transformed into tourist landmarks (Universal City) or become mainly devoted to television series production (Warner Brothers). Film production outside of the studio has been geographically repartitioned to different offices scattered around Los Angeles that operate as a network.

Globally, the percentage of strictly defined cinema and audiovisual employment is inferior to 1% of the GDP. It seems therefore quite marginal on each continent. But the creative industries in Europe (including both visual arts and music, which form the epicenter of the leisure industries) make up almost 6.9%, which translates to 6.5% of all jobs or a figure of 14 million, comparable to jobs in other sectors.

4. Work Markets: the French case

Since 2001, the number of cinematic production companies has grown from 1,289 to 1,542 (1,267 of which are in Ile-de-France). This development is a “manifestation of rather scattered sector activity. The great number of tax-paying companies must be understood in terms of the mere 240 registered feature films produced in 2005. The sixfold inflation of the number of production companies as compared to the number of films shows a dispersion of competences into microstructures with limited means if development and access to international markets”.

Furthermore, out of the average 230 feature films produced yearly in France recently (of which 183 are of French initiative), only four have attracted two million audience members or more to attain the first threshold of profitability. The average number of spectators has remained constant at 200 million for 560 new films distributed in the French market, of which 339 are classified as “art films.” These productions have kept a workshop-style structure, characterized by the considerable dispersal of its companies.

With its great instability, high unemployment rate and use of short-term contracts, this labor market tends toward permanent insecurity. The number of intermittent workers has grown at a faster rate than professional activity in this context characterized by hyperflexibility.

The majority of professionals live in the region of Ile-de-France, where cinema production in particular is concentrated and salaries are 8% higher than the national average. Ile-de-France hosts 45% of cultural industry jobs, 113,500 out of a total of 298,800 in the sector (otherwise put, 2.9% of jobs in Ile-de-France versus 1.6% for the rest of France). 95% of audiovisual and cinema sector jobs are concentrated in this region, grafted onto film making areas both emblematic of technical industry (Boulogne, Joinville-le-Pont) and innovation (Plaine St. Denis/ North Paris, Bry-sur-Marne/East Paris), or more traditional (the 18th arrondissement of Paris and the 8th on the Champs Elysees, grouping the tertiary areas).

The division of labor falls along gendered lines. Sound and image technicians (engineers, chief camera operators, etc.) are more often than not male, as are production managers, whereas

editing and script supervising jobs are traditionally held by a woman. For example, out of 139 props supervisors counted in 2010, only 18 were women. These divisions apply as well to high-responsibility positions. The growth of jobs observed after 1993 essentially concerns the audiovisual sector, where new positions (+10,000 between 1993-2003) have been generated most often in the commercial sector with the sale of audiovisual products (cable televisions, VHS and DVDs), followed in 2005-2007 by the expansion of the workforce in the production of telefilms and programs (+14%) and the emergence of themed channels (+22%). The sector's attractiveness has also justified the creation of new occupations. But audiovisual broadcasters, highly dependent on advertisers, have rendered this growth vulnerable to cyclical downturns while the cinema, with few new jobs, remains tied to the strict economy of its prototype. The absence of reliable statistical sources and the functional versatility of these occupations complicate this calibration.

The connection between the quantitative and qualitative data is ambiguous, and the overly fluid data is likely to stir debate. Certain sources indicate that the workforce may have shrunk between 2001 and 2003, reflecting a crisis in the entertainment sector. 161,164 temporary and 15,802 permanent workers in 2003. 2004 saw a recovery with 103,676 temporary workers, of which 71,026 worked in cinema production (executives, technicians, laborers) and with 16,675 permanent employees including 7,553 technicians. The year 1993 had, in retrospect, marked a turning point with the growing deficit of Unédic (unemployment insurance), due to the gradual augmentation in the number of the policy's beneficiaries (2.8 billion euros in indemnities paid in 1995 to more than 60,000 professionals). From 1946 on, the CNC officially counted 7,301 cinema technicians born after 1928 and possessing a professional license.

This labor market was characterized by a continuous and significant rise in the number of temporary employees. If 1993 signaled a turning point for the exponential curve in the expansion of temporary work, the phenomenon of ascending growth was already well-established. Between 1965 and 1982, the workforce grew by an average of +14% per year. Audiovisual production, dedicated to commercial cinema as well as television, now gives work to three times the number of employees as in the past, while the annual average duration of work contracts has, paradoxically, shortened. Rapid workforce growth correlates to the growth of investments, but does not lead to the possibility of lasting employment. In 1965, 76% of cinema technicians worked more than 1,000 hours per year, as opposed to 57% ten years later. Employment alternates with periods of underemployment or training. In 2004, the wage share in the cinema sector represented 85.2 million euros, for a total of 295 million for all films. This datum implies a great heterogeneity in revenue within each category. In the salary pyramid, a minority of high-profile technicians is extremely well-paid¹. The classic hierarchy of wages was overturned after 1975, aligning audiovisual technicians' salaries with those of cinema technicians. Globally, the wage gap has considerably diminished between audiovisual media and cinema, but this narrowing in the hierarchy gap (with a tendency toward lower salaries for all) has been accomplished to the detriment of temporary employees. This situation occurs in an environment where valuation is made on the basis of acquired reputation. But for a contract of equal length, the average salary of the cinema technician equals that of the audiovisual technician, even if these questions pass over the formation of subgroups within these heterogeneous populations. After the disappearance of classic studios around 1965, laborer workforces in cinema have shrunk by -3% a year.

In a chain of cooperation centered on creative activity, most work roles are based on division of labor. In these professions that have generally remained male-dominated, 80% of technicians are self-taught. They gain an average monthly revenue of about 2,260 euros from weekly contracts for an average of 12 months worked per two years. The professional constraints of temporary work disrupt the balance of family life. With women already underrepresented, these careers are

slowed or interrupted with the arrival of children, even if housewives are no longer the norm. The flexibility and versatility of these professions demand a great amount of availability for intense periods of work, often rendering them incompatible with familial stability. There are an estimated 34,000 technicians subscribed to the organization of temporary workers in audiovisual and cinema, with 2,500 directors and several hundred producers. The formulation of a film project today is at once considered an artwork and a product in the context of hegemonic cultural industries that grant heterogeneous professional and social statuses along the entire production line. Cinema has codified—if not rigidified—a clear divide between different professions. On a shoot, each claims his or her own status, officially legitimized by the Professional Identity Card delivered by the CNC—even though this apparatus, undergoing a crisis, has lost a good part of its efficiency.

5. The New System of Temporary Workers

Temporary workers have above all sought to have their insurance regime's deficit absorbed via the Unédic. The reform presented in annexes 8 and 10 of Unédic, applicable from April 1, 2007 onwards, adapts the June 2003 protocol with some adjustments to satisfy various social movements²⁴. It introduces a common salary convention with eligibility thresholds. Artists and technicians must work 507 hours over 10 months (for technicians) or 10 and a half months (for artists) in order to benefit from unemployment insurance for 243 days or about 8 months. The system has therefore ceased compensation from state funds for those who could not fulfill their hours in the allotted time, but did so within 12 months. In May 2006, the government established a solidarity and professionalization fund to guarantee more complete coverage to artists and technicians. In February 2007, 40,000 short-term workers benefited from this fund, 220 million euros overall. The system then decided on a compensation of 45 euros daily limited to three months, then (after January 2008) regressive to 30 euros per day for a duration that varies with seniority. In 2005, the number of beneficiaries rose to 125,808. In 2016, the system became finally more efficient to regulate the work market, back to 507 hours on 12 months.

The current context of short-term work, with unemployment compensation becoming rarer, has stimulated volunteerism, particularly in audiovisual media. The professional network may appear dedicated to exclusion of outsiders rather than of real professionalization, in this sector whose unemployment has remained structural and jobs unstable. In audiovisual media as in cinema, almost 90% of directors work intermittently. Almost all sign contracts with production companies and part of their remuneration is paid in royalties. The situation is far from that of a salary limited to the time of shooting and editing.

If this professional paradigm is upheld by collective effort and solidary form of economic organization, it creates a number of constraints that do not satisfy all who act in it. A great number rely on differentiated work profiles outside of cinema/audiovisual media fields, notably in the training or education sector. Working on original projects allows them to escape the work routine. It also permits them to lay claim to innovation in a context of mutual expectations. Insofar as the work environment recognizes his or her valuable qualities, including the willingness to serve the collectivity, the volunteer can eventually acquire the status of intermittent worker. As a developer of new audiovisual project ideas, he or she mainly finds autonomy in a framework of informal networks. Volunteerism or activism offers this possibility of artistic activity. But the fragility of professional status is equal to that in audiovisual production, essentially ephemeral.

²⁴ Cf. Pierre Michel-Menger, in chapter 3, le régime d'emploi-chômage intermittent in *Les intermittents du spectacle*, ed Ehes, Paris, 2005, p 97.

This type of volunteerism in audiovisual and cinematic media has led, paradoxically, to greater deprofessionalization. It pushes participants, seeking to free themselves from frameworks they find too normative, into a state of gradual autonomy. We are here within a networking paradigm that advocates an ideal of new social functioning, a culture of action unfolding in the framework of a solidarity economy. Parallel to the informal character of associative networks, participants retain belief in the organization of their own professional lives thanks to intermittent forms of work on short-term projects. In contrast to, but fostered by the contractual model of short-term employment, these work modes involving “activism” and volunteerism often express new forms of flexibility, where the reality of work situations is marked by strong specialization.

In the framework of a fluctuating ergonomics of work, demanding considerable mobility (for indoor or outdoor shooting), the director and production manager acquire a certain power in these new hiring models. They are able to determine the conditions of cooperation between the recruited individuals in each domain. Their roles are not limited to giving orders on the set. However, the director’s power in terms of hiring choices remains relative, even if his or her role has been symbolically reinforced in the history of cinema.

6. Production Networks

In production, behind their homogeneous job titles, intermittent workers engage in a great functional variety in roles defined by the hierarchy pyramid. However, the production charter offers an equivalent rank to the production manager and the director in terms of policy coordination. The director gives orders without appearing as a hierarchical superior in the chain of command. In this dual model of actors/technicians, the actors do not depend directly on the production manager.

Can we there speak of a distorted operation? What clearly established authority ensures the chain of command and the overall efficiency of the organization while encompassing such heterogeneity of professional statuses?

Through a variety of styles and a combination of functional traits, can we evoke several typologies within this management crew, from the director to the production manager?

Directors and producers are legally guarantors of the film, but they remain outside of the studio hierarchies with whom they have contracted. Held responsible for the film, the director may rely on the production manager for its realization. The production manager fills an intermediary role of qualified executive, officially entrusted with the organization of essential production tasks without always having adequate professional solutions. Formulated temporarily on the set, this work apparatus reinforces a micronetwork system and confers to this potentially contentious collaboration the power to end all inopportune interactions.

Production managers must demonstrate the skill of an expert or licensed technician. This position implies a certain visibility both internally and externally to the film. They inevitably have to assume specific responsibility at different levels in the division of work and the allotment of tasks. Hence, their role as expert grants them management rights equal to that of an industry executive over an assembly-line. Delegated up-front by the producer, the production manager has a task beyond that of decision-making in production.

Coming from a technical background and an authorized representative of the producer, the production manager must above all possess a technician’s eye. He plans and ensures the proper functioning and the daily operational coordination of the film, striving to maintain the balance

between individual demands and the overall artistic, technical and administration organization within the allotted time. Potentially at the center of conflicts, the production manager benefits from a professional identity strong enough to direct complex negotiations. He possesses strategic advantages over the director, thanks to his ability on the one hand to professionally evaluate the recruited crews, and on the other to inform the director of internal and external situations.

In the case of (generally rare) conflicts during the shoot, the director's role is ambiguous. Responsible for finishing the film, she must protect herself and preserve her relationship with the crew while preventing overly forceful interactions from detracting from the work's realization. It is essential that the technical and artistic crew conform to her decisions. Legitimized by her experience as well as reputation, her competence as an expert facilitates the overall management of interactions. Negotiations that in the course a shoot as problems arise and routines unfold demand a layman's technical know-how. Supported by prestige and studio mandate, the director possesses a separate "authority" distinct from that of the production manager, who has the more administrative role. The relationship between the director and production manager implies a hierarchy of skills in the division of labor, wherein authority is conferred by experience.

In this specific branch of cinema careers, the hierarchy is almost invisible. Some directing styles are more or less tyrannical and may reveal certain personal qualities. In this regard, a director may have to give orders or lead a crew with a higher competence than her own. Organizational and technical imperatives eventually carry the day. On a misleadingly egalitarian-seeming pyramid of day-to-day interactions, the director always has the final word for a technical crew subject to her decisions. An insufficient knowledge of directing technique may therefore exacerbate conflicts of all types. But there exists no higher authority in the usual shooting environment to settle these questions.

Apart from the producer with his "performance guarantee," no one may consider a director's decision a liability for the shoot. The proprietor of the film, the director has nonetheless limited power. Only financial decisions made outside the shoot may compromise the film's fate.

7. The Range of Action

How may we reconsider these technicians' actions on-site? Our investigation essentially concerned documentary accounts collected during preparations for shoots in the form of oral interviews encompassing different codes of action. The professional groups observed on these shoots will also facilitate a new reflection on specific forms of action.

Those interviewed here constantly justify their actions. But we may assume that during the action itself, it is not the justification that counts but rather the tasks that constituted this action. These actions are justified by certain situations during a shoot, to the point of creating new validation frameworks. The great emotional value placed technicians' experience reveals all its importance to on a shoot. The predominance of this "subjectivity" erases the hierarchical character of each person's position and reinforces the spontaneous character of the film. This apparent indeterminacy is a way of governing professional behaviors.

A problem is always dealt with in a pragmatic manner by the practical work of the technicians. On the strength of his past experiences, and despite the fact that the responsibility may be shared with the other supervisors, the production manager shoulders full responsibility for the consequences of this technical management. He must act and react in a normative production context within an institutional financial aid system for the cinema, which dictates a number of

rules to be respected. The production manager exerts authority over a range of variables in this way, deciding both immediate and removed questions in order to coordinate the professional corps. The primary organizer of this process, he not only possesses a certain power over his subordinates, but also organizes and reasons his own actions. Taking action requires him to create a general model of balanced coordination, which implicates him directly in choice of those hired and in the forms of action taking place with outside service providers. His experience acquired on other shoots serve as a working base, but must be tailored to serve this new coordinating project. Initiator of hiring processes for his crews, the production manager is present at the delicate interaction zones between the technicians and supervisors. He takes a certain risk in terms of reputation in the case of failure.

Of late, the production manager regulates conduct in the dispersed areas of location shoots. Each shooting situation allows him to determine the action needed according to a work plan. A number of action schemes exist for these fragmented interaction systems (from pre- to post-production). Film's temporal aspect confers a vital importance on these preparatory phases of the film, as well as its finishing stages. The organizational apparatus is created in relation with different locales for the purposes of the shoots. The difficulties encountered in circulating information between those concerned can, in the framework of certain local interactions, influence the process of finishing the film. Aside from the production manager, the supervisors wield decision-making power in project interactions. This situation tends to reinforce the individualization and isolation of the production manager in relation to his crew and in his way of taking charge or energizing the shoot. The tendency to individualism is also strengthened by the collective if not interdependent character of the crew. Overall, after the director, the production manager is the main point of reference outside of this system of technical competences specific to the shoot.

This context of production within norms requires a kind of empirical rationality that allows each problem to be solved in the order of its priority. The preparation phases give him a framework for validating his professional action. At the crossroads of the technical and the artistic, his pivotal function justifies the use of forms of coordination based on confidence, reputation, or the common interest. These justifications legitimize actions at the individual and collective level.

8. Professional trajectories

When we recognize the complex and uncertain character of film production in history, it could seem a vain effort to designate overly rigid barriers in a system split between small-scale and industrial production. These questions are clearly linked to the unique character of film in different production contexts as both prototype and cultural merchandise. These questions bring us to redefine the idea of an development framework for different categories of technicians, foregrounding the the trans-frontier character of different professional trajectories. If certain individual situations are very dissimilar, more middle managers overall are employed in the audiovisual sector than in the cinema field alone. Comparing our collected interviews, we may measure the impact of different ruptures (between television and cinema, public and private, etc.) on the professions after the privatization of audiovisual media after 1986 in France.

Certain essential conditions are vital for constructing this legitimation of a technician on the cinema's professional scene:

- First, professional experience determines an exclusive competence acquired from other professionals during work situations. This experience is forged on-site in accomplishing the ensemble of tasks, allowing the worker to gain a concrete understanding of different roles

in the creating of a film. The experience acquired on shoots is thus indispensable training (notably in the production department).

- If the person who holds a monopoly over a professional exercise enjoys recognition for his accomplishment, this career advancement allows the gradual establishment of his membership in the professional corps. The exchange of services at every level helps to carry out a production, even in a relatively vertical organization like that demanded by a film crew. A filmic project requires the production manager to combine a totality of resources (studio, services) and to mobilize crews while balancing technical and artistic, spontaneous and concrete aspects.
- The dynamic of competence is subject to competition. These professional relationships raise the question of attaining professional qualifications. Can it come from inheritance? From simple training, a particular skill or vocation?
- Up to the present day, with relative stability, these cinema professions have established the division of their field of activity into different corporations. In the past half a century, the monopoly of these technicians' professional organizations has been effectively recognized and legitimated. The group of primary decision-makers (Director, Producer, Production Manager) has subsequently participated in the creation of guidelines that progressively train the applicant for his future function as production manager. His skills, acquired in new and perpetually unstable crews, eventually permit him to access this status.
- Access to the profession, often by vocation, little by little becomes coupled with activity that is recognized and paid at the end of the whole process and according to the different career rungs attained. The result of integration, employment is merely occasional, despite an often exemplary career path. A production manager must constantly be put to the test. The future of a film in progress either gives or does not give an economic and social foundation to the production manager in the form of a new project, whatever its nature (film or telefilm, documentary or fiction), the mobilization and the size of the crew, the time constraints or the required skills.
- A reflection of this collective construction, the cinema draws support from different authorities (professional lobbies, unions and networks, public policy) that validate the process of filmic creation. Originally a technician, the production manager is still an intermittent employee in the arts. His vocation and skills are put into question in an almost experimental, incessant fashion. The organization of his professional life is oriented towards spontaneity, based on skills acquired during the course of his career.
- Licensing, subject to state regulation, reinforces the criteria for the conditions of professional practice. Public policies participate directly in the enabling rules that legitimate professional activity, a sine qua non validating access to the profession.

If the professional identity card, abolished today, is not sufficient for finding work where career opportunity depends on reputation, the system implies rhythms of collaboration that remain constant in the market and ambiguous attitudes about public policy, varying with work conditions. But how should we understand that in a chain of professions, the production manager is a part of a professional corps that he helped organize, and within which he distinguished himself?

9. Limits of Autonomy

The chosen professional gains a legal monopoly in the form of a license delivered by the CNC until 2009. In this context, autonomy is only partial, because it is derived from the profession which autolimits and controls these fluxes. The production manager, beside the producer to whom he has become an indispensable asset, possesses forms of exclusive competence, conducting methods of credited production. The results of his performance on a feature film or in telefilms

leads him to new roles. In the French cinema context of semi- industrial production, the profession legitimates its own services. During the 20th century and after 1936, the production manager only consolidated his position, reinforcing the corporatism of intermediate agents in the chain. Technical crews are therefore receptive and able to validate the power of this defined, ascendant professional role, in doing so moderating the roles of producer and director.

Is there a qualitative change in these professionalization stages today? How does a professional group gradually consolidate its position from a starting point of precarious gains? How does a group of cinema professionals become able to exercise state-formalized control over their own work? In fact, the real situation of work passes through the state via the funding process.

On a shoot, might there exist a management model that takes into account interpersonal relations -- more or less personal – within the crew and defining more and less approved initiatives?

In the daily reality of a shoot, the crew does not seem like a truly homogeneous organization. The relational contract ushers in a chain of dependance. In this way, the technician—not a manager-- finds himself torn between the possibility to prove his capabilities and his dependance on supervisors²⁵. In order to establish himself for a length of time as a professional, each person must rely on a complex system of exchange. In this competitive context, one must confirm adherence to a group while affirming one's individuality, joining long-term activity with short- term employment. Economically, irregularity and instability are the main cost of adaptation. This type of flexibility in the cinematographic milieu has been able to conjure specific conventions to regulate limited-time crews. An estimated 30% of technicians are paid and regulated by the collective bargaining agreement. However, a large-budget film allows the hiring of an enlarged crew while repartitioning the overall workloads while offering salaries more in line with the convention, remunerating hours dedicated to preparation or overtime (8 hours per day or 7 hours without a break). At the bottom rung, laborers with little mobility support more qualified technicians.

Beyond various participants' technical competencies and specialties, each person is essentially motivated by the film's creation and its context. There exist few debates on film management models in practice. Rather, debates focus after the fact on the question of control. Hence, regarding each person's motivation and the human resources mobilized for a project, the effects of the model vary according to the nature of the tasks allotted during the daily routine of the shoot.

We must here question the relevance of a performance model²⁶. The nature of the services furnished is a function of the role that the crew wishes to play, conforming to an implicit and accepted division of labor. This implication is a strong determining factor in the quality of the results. How can we determine or quantify the cinema in terms of artistic value versus the unit cost of a take, mobilizing an ensemble of energies and participants, such as the camera operator or the director of photography?

From this perspective, the professional “norms of the set” and “outside norms” (for example, the very important factor of the number of audience members) intersect, giving body to the idea of

²⁵ Cf Nathalie Heinich, *L'élite artistique*, Gallimard, Paris, 2005.

²⁶ Cf. Andrew Abott, *The system of professions, an essay on the division of expert labor*, University Press of Chicago, Chicago, 1988. Eliot Freidson, *La profession médicale*, Payot, Paris, 1984 (*profession of medecine*, Harper and Row, New York, 1970); Edward C. Hughes, *Le regard sociologique*, EHESS, Paris, 1996 (*The sociological eye*, Aldine, Chicago, 1971).

performance. These inside and outside rules are internalized altogether. Professionalism demands control over the content of a work via methods that have been transmitted within the professional body. A work plan structures the rhythms and cadences of the shoot; its impact is significant for the general organization.

Although her prestige develops concretely from day to day as she accomplishes the work along with the production manager, the director must prove her expert skill. Rules only gain meaning, credibility and efficiency insofar as they are followed (respect for work hours, evaluations). This presupposes the management of a mass of information concerning the work to be done. While each professional knows his position in a pre-established division of labor, these rules take on a prominent and permanent position at the heart of daily arrangements.

In this way, an often fragmented perception of the work is preserved during the shoot, without always allowing to identify the production manager's ensemble perspective. The editing process in parallel adds to this fracturing of the entire work process in postproduction. If the production manager must control the work organization of all and to have an overall vision, the director must evaluate the technical assets of this realization using filmed takes or through the *mise-en-scène*. Furthermore, the control process does not involve a corporate database, but concerns a system of codified practices. In the collective context, the production manager institutes a form of consensus which may be the object of a common strategy shared by the different participants on the set. The production director regulates others time or oversees the work from a close perspective. The need for strong tendency toward rationality prevails, all the more so because the division of labor, established before the shoot, has already created a filter for access. The division of labor thus somewhat reduces unpredictability.

With new economic constraints resulting from the privatization of audiovisual media, the similarity between types of technicians, more feigned than real, oblige them to work on distinct segments of production (film, telefilms, advertising). How should we interpret these contemporary transformations of traditional cinema professions in light of the global evolution in media? This new media economy has reduced possibilities for the autonomy of the profession, leading to new, unseen forms of division of labor within the technician workforce.

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Prison On Break? The Prison Cycle and the Korean Film Industry

Abstract

The South Korean film industry seems to have reached the point of saturation in the domestic market. In 2016, according to the KOFIC (Korean Film Council), the export of Korean films abroad increased by 49% compared to the previous year, yet the overall domestic admissions figure began to decrease (Ahn, Feb 2017), despite the annual revenues slightly up by 1.6 %. The 10 million admissions mark is still a measure of the mega-hit status with *Train to Busan* (dir. Yeon Sang-ho, 2016), the first Korean zombie film on screen, and *A Taxi Driver* (dir. Jang Hun, 2017), a film depicting the 1980 Kwangju Uprising, ranked at the top in 2016 and 2017 with the 11.5 million and 12 million ticket admissions, respectively. Korean auteurs, represented by Hong Sang-soo and Kim Ki-duk, appear at film festivals on a regular basis, with the two directors featuring their latest work at the Berlin International Film Festival in 2017 and 2018.

Popular genres, which occupy the middle ground in the industry, have been diversifying while still heavily relying on genre tropes of the North-South issues (*Confidential Assignment*, *Steel Rain*, 2017) and policier (*The Outlaws*, 2017), which have dominated since the renaissance of the industry in the early 2000s. This presentation will examine the “prison” cycle, as a variant of such trends, which emerged as a profitable cycle with the box office hit, *A Violent Prosecutor* (dir. Lee Il-hyung, 2016), followed by *The Prison* (dir. Na Hyeon, 2017), *The Merciless* (dir. Byun Sung-hyun, 2017), and the latest television series *Prison Playbook* (dir. Shin Won-ho, aired in Nov 2017- Jan 2018 on tvN). Often featuring undercover cops or anti-heroes who reside inside the prison while manipulating their former inmates outside of the prison, these films transfer the major setting of the policier genre from the outskirts of urban spaces, to prisons, reversing the trajectory of both the narrative and characters. Focusing on *A Violent Prosecutor* and *The Prison*, which mirror each other in that it is the falsely accused attorney in the former and the inmate in the latter, who orchestrate the revenge and conduct crimes outside the prison, I will tease out the implications of prison as a metonymic space in these films, and the significance of such a nascent trope within the mentioned popular genres.

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Bio

Jinhee Choi was educated at Seoul National University (South Korea) and completed a B.A. and M.A. in Aesthetics. She earned two PhDs—one in Philosophy and the other in Film Studies—at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (United States) and was a post doctorate/ visiting professor in East Asian Studies and Film Studies at Yale University. She previously taught at Carleton University (Canada) and the University of Kent before moving to King's College in 2011.

Session 3 | Thursday afternoon

Chair: Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh (Visual Studies, CCS, Lingnan University)

Syou-Ling Fu (Communication, National Chengchi University)

Developing Scripts in the New Era

Abstract

However rapid and imaginative the technology developed in filmmaking, the filmmakers worldwide are still trying their best to tell their stories through four basic aspects: the Script, the Performers, the Visual Arts and the Audio Charms. The first key to the gate is how to help filmmakers build solid scripts with the other three aspects, and viewers in mind.

Bio

Syou-Ling Fu has worked in the film, television and multimedia industry for 40 years. She has extensive professional experience as a writer, editor, producer and director in both Asia and the U.S.

Syou-Ling received an MFA in Film Production from the School of Cinematic Arts of University of Southern California. Later, she became a Research Associate Professor for the same program. Her work during this time including producer, director, scriptwriter, editor and script doctor in Hollywood, Taipei and Tokyo.

Currently, Syou-Ling is an Assistant Professor at the College of Communication of National Cheng-Chi University. She also works for Film Unlimited in HK and Beijing, and One Production Film Co. in Taiwan as a script doctor, consultant and instructor.

Shi Chuan (Shanghai Theatre Academy)

Crowd sourcing, Niche audience: Independent Distributors in China

Abstract

With BAT's domination of the e-commerce market and popular media, there are also smaller film and media companies participating with conventional craft knowledge in story sourcing, production, and promotion. The presentation centres on frontline experiences in cultivating a niche audience for art cinema via e-platform made available for independent companies in Shanghai.

Bio

Shi Chuan is Professor in the Shanghai Theatre Academy; Deputy Chair of the Shanghai Film Association; Board member of the China Film Association; Senior Consultant of the Shanghai Cultural Development Foundation and Executive Academic Director at the Shanghai Film Museum.

Winnie Tsang (Managing Director, Golden Scene)

Film Distribution in Hong Kong: Market, Censors and Audiences

Abstract

Hong Kong film market has been gradually marginalised by the exploding market in the Chinese mainland. Consolidating and conglomeration has restructured the local film industry since the inception of CEPA. The talk will be a dialogue on film distribution in the regulatory framework of CEPA between the organiser and Winnie Tsang, managing director of Golden Scene, an independent film distributor established since 1998.

Bio

Winnie Tsang Lai-fun is a quiet mover and shaker as managing director of the city's largest independent film distribution company, Golden Scene, which she started in 1998 after spending 20 years in the legendary halls of Golden Harvest Entertainment. Defying the risks of starting a business at the height of the Asian economic crisis, Golden Scene soon developed a reputation for getting behind unique, quirky movies and turning them into box office gold.

Lin Wenchi (English, National Central University)

Old Films Never Die, They Just Fade Away: The Digital Restoration and Promotion of Taiwan Film Classics

Abstract

A great number of films made in Taiwan in the past vanished due to ignorance of or indifference to film preservation. Many of those lucky enough to be preserved by the film archive are in dire condition. Without digital restoration, these films are invisible to the world like ghost in the archive. Taiwan Film Institute began to actively restore old films in 2012, when it was still called Chinese Taipei Film Archive. It was made possible by an extra annual budget, of which about 7.5 million was devoted to commissioning a handful of films to labs for restoration. When I took the helm of TFA in 2013, I decided to turn the tight budget preservation-oriented work of digital restoration into an aggressive fundraising and promotional activity. Within the three years of my directorship TFA managed to restore King Hu's *A Touch of Zen*, Li Hsing's *The Young One*, two films starring the popular singer Feng Feifei, *Love in Chilly Spring* and *Autumn Lotus*, a Taiwanese language film *Goodbye, Taipei*, and Hou Hsiao-hsien's *Daughter of the Nile*, as well as started the restoration of King Hu's *Legend in the Mountain* and another Taiwanese language film, Li Hsing's *Brother Wang And Brother Liu Tour Taiwan*, and *Cloud of Romance*, all of which except one were restored with donations or free of charge. By sending the digitally restored films to Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Locarno and other international film festivals, TFA not only gained a good reputation for its digital restoration but also made good international sales for the restored titles. The presentation will be a recounting of this part of my work at TFA as well as the films festivals I organize to promote film classics after I left TFA.

Bio

Wenchi Lin teaches at the English Department of National Central University in Taiwan. He has published several articles on Chinese cinema in Chinese and co-edited *Passionate Detachment: Critical Essays on Hou Hsiao-Hsien (Xilian rensheng: Hou Xiaoxian dianying yanjiu)*. He is also the editor-in-chief of the online film magazine *FunScreen Weekly (Fangying zhoubao)*.